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COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Alan 0. Sykes*
INTRODUCTION
Popular rhetoric holds that American companies can compete suc-
cessfully against foreign companies on a "level playing field," but can-
not hope to compete effectively against foreign companies that receive
unfair competitive advantages from their governments. This proposi-
tion is put forward to justify, among other things, the countervailing
duty laws of the United States. Under those laws, if a foreign govern-
ment provides a "subsidy" to a company that exports its products to
the United States, those exports may become subject to additional cus-
toms duties that ostensibly eliminate the competitive advantage attribu-
table to the subsidy. Such duties are termed "countervailing duties,"
and are imposed to offset the "countervailable benefits" of foreign sub-
sidy practices.
The authority for the imposition of countervailing duties under
United States law has existed since the Tariff Act of 1897.1 Prior to
1974, however, only fifty-eight countervailing duties were imposed
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I have received helpful com-
ments on prior drafts of this paper from Douglas Baird, Richard Craswell, Frank
Easterbrook, Geoffrey Miller and Richard Posner, and from the faculty and students of
the University of Michigan Seminar on International Economic Law and Policy and the
Stanford University and University of Toronto Law and Economics Seminars. I also
thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for financial support.
1. See Ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205. Originally, countervailing duties were applied
only to imports of beet sugar from Europe, a response to the introduction of export
subsidies by certain European nations. See 30 Cong. Rec. 2203 (1897) (remarks of Sen.
Gray) (discussing Wilson Bill of 1894). In 1897, the countervailing duty law was modi-
fied to apply to all products. See id. at 2202 (reprinting Senate Finance Committee bill).
The policy debate surrounding this modification of the countervailing duty laws was
quite thin, but two arguments for the use of countervailing duties were advanced. First,
supporters claimed that countervailing duties were necessary to preserve the level of
protection afforded by existing tariffs. That is, if the tariff on some good was, say, 20%
ad valorem, and an export subsidy of 10% ad valorem on that good was introduced abroad,
the level of protection afforded by the 20% tariff would be reduced by (roughly) one-
half. A countervailing duty of 10% ad valorem was suggested as the appropriate re-
sponse. See id. at 2224 (remarks of Sen. Chandler). A second argument for counter-
vailing duties was the claim that subsidies create an "artificial" advantage, which if left
uncorrected would distort the pattern of trade and destroy the industry of the importing
nation-"natural advantages possessed by one country ought not to be offset by artifi-
cial aids afforded by another." Id. at 2225-26 (remarks of Sen. Caffery).
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by the United States.2 But changes to the law in the Trade Act of
19743 and the Trade Agreements Act of 19794 considerably increased
the probability that a petition for countervailing duties would be suc-
cessful within a reasonable period of time.5 As a result, the number of
countervailing duty cases has risen substantially, with hundreds of
countervailing duty petitions filed since 1980.6 These petitions have
resulted in countervailing duties on a wide range of products, as well as
a number of "settlements" in which the U.S. petitioners withdrew their
petition following the negotiation of alternative trade restrictions. 7 Be-
yond question, therefore, countervailing duties are an increasingly im-
portant tool of U.S. trade policy, and recent developments suggest no
end to that trend.8
This Article questions the growing, unilateral9 use of countervailing
duties by the United States. Although enforceable multilateral cove-
nants prohibiting inefficient subsidy practices may well be in the mutual
2. See Cooper, U.S. Policies and Practices on Subsidies in International Trade, in
International Trade and Industrial Policies 106, 114 (S. Warnecke ed. 1978).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331, 88 Stat. 1978, 2049-53 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101-107, 93 Stat. 144, 150-93 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982)).
5. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (Aug. 23, 1988), contains a number of minor amendments to the counter-
vailing duty laws, which do not affect the analysis to follow.
6. The International Trade Commission participates only in countervailing duty in-
vestigations that include an injury test. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
At the close of fiscal year 1987, the Commission had completed at least the preliminary
investigations in 289 cases filed pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. See
U.S. International Trade Commission Ann. Rep. 39 (1987).
7. Perhaps the single most important settlement resulted from the recent investiga-
tion of Canadian softwood lumber products. The U.S. petitioners withdrew their peti-
tion after Canada agreed to impose a 15% tax on its exports to the United States-a
volume of exports in excess of $2 billion annually. See [Jan-June] 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
Current Rep. (BNA) 6 (Jan. 7, 1987). The export tax was later lifted after the Canadian
government agreed to raise the prices charged for the right to harvest timber on govern-
ment lands. Id. at 1586 (Dec. 23, 1987).
Many countervailing duty petitions covering steel products from various countries
were withdrawn after the Reagan Administration negotiated voluntary restraint agree-
ments with major foreign steel suppliers. E.g., fJan-June] 2 Int'l Trade Rep. Current
Rep. (BNA) 757-58 (June 5, 1985). Negotiating leverage was provided by a number of
affirmative countervailing duty determinations, as well as by affirmative antidumping de-
terminations and an affirmative determination under the "escape clause." See
[July-Dec.] I Int'l Trade Rep. Current Rep. (BNA) 67-68 (July 18, 1984).
8. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 expanded the reach of the countervailing duty
laws to encompass "upstream subsidies"-subsidies paid to the producers of inputs to
merchandise exported to the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1 (Supp. III 1985). The
recent decision of the United States Court of International Trade in Cabot Corp. v.
United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 730-32 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), substantially increased
the likelihood that foreign government suppliers of natural resources will be found to
confer a "subsidy." See Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Can., 51 Fed. Reg.
37,453 (1986); Carbon Black from Mex., 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269 (1986).
9. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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interest of participating nations, 10 the unilateral imposition of counter-
vailing duties on "subsidized" imports does not systematically promote
national economic welfare, and existing law is poorly tailored to iden-
tify the cases in which countervailing duties are arguably beneficial. In-
stead, the duties are imposed mechanistically under conditions that
may often produce a considerable net welfare loss to the U.S. economy.
As a consequence, duties under existing law will enhance national eco-
nomic welfare only by chance. Because the need for any type of coun-
tervailing duty policy is questionable, abolition of the countervailing
duty laws might best serve the national economic interest." Short of
such a complete reversal of policy, there are several possible directions
for reform in the law that would enhance national economic welfare by
imposing additional limitations upon the use of countervailing duties.12
Part I explains existing U.S. countervailing duty law. Part II con-
trasts economic efficiency and distributional concerns as possible goals
for U.S. trade policy in general, and countervailing duty policy in par-
ticular. Part III examines the economic consequences of countervailing
duties under conditions of perfect competition. Part IV examines cir-
cumstances that create departures from perfect competition in the la-
bor market. Part V considers circumstances in which the product
10. Thus, for example, the analysis in this Article should not be taken as an attack
upon efforts by the United States to secure international agreement regarding the elimi-
nation of agricultural subsidies.
11. Similar suggestions have been advanced with respect to the antidumping laws.
See, e.g., Barcelo, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, in Antidumping Law:
Policy and Implementation 53, 77 (J.Jackson ed. 1979); Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Unfair
International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 323, 337 (1983).
Unlike the countervailing duty laws, the antidumping laws address purely private
conduct-either international price discrimination or sales below (roughly) long-run av-
erage cost. Many writers have suggested that subsidies raise more subtle issues than
dumping that may warrant some policy response. See infra notes 12, 127, 210 & 218.
12. The law and economics literature on countervailing duties is sparse. Schwartz
and Harper argue that useful efforts to discipline trade-distorting subsidies require an
international standard for the identification of such subsidies, yet they find it impossible
to formulate a workable standard. Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Af-
fecting International Trade, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 831, 851-54 (1972). This view is devel-
oped further in Schwartz, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: Countervailing Duties
and the Regulation of International Trade, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 297, 304-08, which ar-
gues generally against the use of countervailing duties. Barcelo, by contrast, finds con-
siderable merit in the use of countervailing duties to counteract export subsidies, as well
as targeted domestic subsidies that cause injury to an import-competing industry and
that cannot be justified as a means to correct market failures. See Barcelo, Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 Law & Pol. Int'l Bus. 779, 799-801
(1977). Bryan reaches a similar conclusion. See G. Bryan, Taxing Unfair International
Trade Practices 279 (1980). Finally, Goetz, Granet & Schwartz posit that the counter-
vailing duty laws are not intended to promote efficiency, but instead provide domestic
producers with an entitlement to protection against injury due to foreign subsidies.
They argue from this premise for reform of the way in which duties are calculated. See
Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, The Meaning of 'Subsidy' and 'Injury' in the Countervailing
Duty Law, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 17, 26-29 (1986).
1989]
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market is in one way or another imperfectly competitive. Finally, Part
VI considers whether countervailing duties might be justified as part of
a broader multilateral system for the discouragement of trade-dis-
torting subsidy practices or the facilitation of trade liberalization.
I. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES UNDER EXISTING LAW
Like most Western developed countries, the United States is a sig-
natory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT).'1 It is
also a signatory to the GATT "Subsidies Code," which was negotiated
in the late 1970s.14 Both the GATT and the Subsidies Code permit
signatories to apply countervailing duties to "subsidized" imports, but
do not require their application. 15 Thus, at present, countervailing du-
ties are a tool of "unilateral" trade policy.' 6 The United States is free
to use them, or not, subject only to limited restrictions contained in
Article VI of the GATT and in the Subsidies Code.1 7 Moreover, the
United States has been the only major trading nation to use counter-
vailing duties extensively.' 8 With very few exceptions, other importing
countries do not impose countervailing duties on the subsidized prod-
ucts that become subject to countervailing duties in the United States.
Therefore, U.S. countervailing duty policy is genuinely unilateral-
both de jure and de facto. 19
Countervailing duty actions under U.S. law begin with the filing of
a petition for duties by representatives of a U.S. industry (a firm, union,
or trade association, for example) that competes with the allegedly sub-
sidized imports.20 Depending upon the country of origin of the im-
ports under investigation and several other factors, the case then
proceeds under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 193021 or section 701
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts.
5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; J. Jackson & W. Davey, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations 298 (2d ed. 1986).
14. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Basic Instruments and Selected
Documents 56-83 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code];J.Jackson & W. Da-
vey, supra note 13, at 752.
15. Of course, GAIT obligations do not constrain U.S. policy with respect to non-
signatories absent some bilateral agreement with a nonsignatory to extend the protec-
tions of the GAT to its exports.
16. Multilateral policies respecting subsidies raise rather different analytical issues,
which are discussed briefly at infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 24 & 41.
18. The European Community and Japan almost never impose countervailing du-
ties; Canada and Australia use them infrequently. The only other nation to use them
with any regularity is Chile. SeeJ.Jackson & W. Davey, supra note 13, at 727. To some
extent, however, the European Community uses "dumping" duties in lieu of counter-
vailing duties.
19. This fact alone may raise serious doubt about the wisdom of U.S. policy.
20. The Department of Commerce can also initiate countervailing duty investiga-
tions. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982).
21. Id. § 1303.
[Vol. 89:199
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of the Act, which was added by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
("1979 Act").2 2 Both statutes require the International Trade Admin-
istration (ITA), an arm of the Department of Commerce, to determine
whether a countervailable subsidy has been provided to the producers
of the imports in question.2 3 Only the 1979 Act, however, requires an
"injury test" in all investigations. 24 The injury test precludes the impo-
sition of countervailing duties solely upon a finding that a subsidy has
been bestowed, and requires a further determination by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) that subsidized imports are causing or
threatening to cause "injury" to U.S. producers of competing products.
A. The Analysis of Subsidization
Like the GATT and the GATT Subsidies Code, U.S. law distin-
guishes "export" subsidies from "domestic" subsidies.2 5 An "export"
subsidy may be defined (quite roughly) as any government program or
practice that increases the profitability of export sales but does not sim-
ilarly increase the profitability of sales for domestic consumption.2 6 Ex-
amples include government payments to manufacturers that are
contingent upon export volume, the manipulation of market-deter-
mined exchange rates to favor export sales or production for export,
the provision of goods or services by the government for use in the
production of exports on more favorable terms than for use in the pro-
duction of goods for domestic consumption, and a variety of other
22. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1677 (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
23. The standards for this determination are the same under section 303 and sec-
tion 701. The Tariff Act of 1930 provides for the imposition of countervailing duties to
offset any "bounty or grant" paid or bestowed upon the imports under investigation,
although nowhere is the phrase "bounty or grant" defined. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provides for the imposition of countervailing duties
to offset any "subsidy" to the producers of the imports under investigation and pro-
ceeds to define the concept of "subsidy" with reference to the term "bounty or grant" in
the 1930 Act. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988). Consequently,
the determination whether a particular foreign government practice is countervailable
does not depend upon which statutory provision governs. See Certain Fresh Cut Flow-
ers from Mex., 49 Fed. Reg. 15,007, 15,010 (1984); Certain Steel Products from BeIg.,
47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,328 (1982).
24. The GATT Subsidies Code requires the United States and other signatories to
utilize an injury test in countervailing duty investigations involving imports from other
Code signatories. See Subsidies Code, supra note 14, art. 4(4). The United States also
applies the injury test to imports from countries that have assumed obligations toward
the United States that are substantially equivalent to those of the Subsidies Code, to
imports from countries that are entitled to the injury test by virtue of most-favored na-
tion clauses in bilateral agreements with the United States, and to all duty-free imports
regardless of the country of origin. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982); id. § 1303(a)(2).
25. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
26. The identification of export subsidies may prove quite troublesome in practice.
See generally G. Hufbauer & J. Erb, Subsidies in International Trade 45-88 (1984)
(identifying and describing types of export duties).
1989] 203
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practices.27
Government practices that cannot be characterized as export subsi-
dies are countervailable under U.S. law only if they fall within the statu-
tory definition of a "domestic" subsidy.28 Virtually any type of
government program can confer a domestic subsidy if it meets two cri-
teria: it must be sufficiently targeted "to a specific enterprise or indus-
try, or group of enterprises or industries," and, roughly, it must
provide some opportunity or advantage to the targeted producers that
would not otherwise be available to them in the marketplace. 29
The targeting criterion-commonly known as the "specificity test"
or the "general availability test"-ensures that many of the familiar ac-
tivities of governments are not characterized as "subsidies." For exam-
ple, public education, government-financed highway and railway
systems, national telecommunications networks, and even national de-
fense activities provide economic benefits to domestic producers, but
these benefits ordinarily accrue to a wide range of industries. Thus,
such activites usually are not countervailable. In contrast, a special pro-
gram to educate workers in the semiconductor industry or a special rail
rate for the coal industry might well be countervailable. In practice, the
targeting criterion can be quite difficult to apply. The countervailing
duty laws provide no guidance as to what constitutes more than a
"group" of enterprises or industries, thus leaving the ITA with consid-
erable latitude in the assessment of targeting.30
27. Annex A to the Subsidies Code is an "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies."
Subsidies Code, supra note 14, at 80-82. United States law includes within the term
"subsidy" any practice described in this illustrative list. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5)(A) (West
1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
28. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
29. Id. § 1677(5)(B).
30. For example, the agricultural sector has been found to constitute more than a
"group" of industries, and thus an irrigation project to benefit all farmers within the
jurisdiction of the government that finances the project is not countervailable. See
Fresh Asparagus from Mex., 48 Fed. Reg. 21,618, 21,621-22 (1983). If a national gov-
ernment finances a program to assist all agricultural and manufacturing industries in a
depressed region of the country, however, the program is "regionally" targeted and
thus countervailable. See, e.g., Lamb Meat from N.Z., 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708, 37,710-11
(1985). And if the national government establishes a program to provide aid to all farm-
ers in the country who require aid in the judgment of an administrative agency, and that
agency indeed provides aid to producers of a number of agricultural commodities (but
not all agricultural commodities), the aid is potentially countervailable. See Live Swine
and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Prods. from Can., 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097, 25,101
(1985).
As another example, the ITA held at one time that the sale of rights to harvest
softwood timber could not confer countervailable benefits because such rights were
used by the lumber, paper, furniture, veneer, turpentine, charcoal, food additive, and
other industries. See Softwood Lumber Prods. from Can., 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,167
(1983). Following the decision in Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985), which required the ITA to consider whether benefits are targeted "de
facto" even though nominally available to many industries, the ITA later reversed itself
because most of the rights were used by the lumber and paper industries. See Certain
204 [Vol. 89:199
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The second criterion in the definition of domestic subsidies-an
opportunity or advantage not otherwise available in the market-
place3 l-serves both to identify and to quantify the subsidy. If a gov-
ernment makes a loan at prevailing market rates, for example, no
subsidy exists even if the loan program is highly targeted. But if the
targeted loan program provides funds below the prevailing market rate,
a subsidy exists, and the value of the subsidy is calculated on the basis
of the differential between the actual rate and the market rate.3 2 The
value of the subsidy is measured with reference to the benefit conferred
upon the targeted industry, rather than the cost of the subsidy to the
government.33
Finally, U.S. law allows only a few adjustments to the subsidy calcu-
lation to reflect taxes or other charges paid to the government by the
beneficiaries of the subsidy program. Offsets are allowed for applica-
tion fees, deposits, or similar charges in connection with the subsidy
program itself.3 4 But the countervailing duty laws will not look beyond
the government program under investigation to calculate net benefits-
foreign producers cannot argue that the benefits of one program are
Softwood Lumber Prods. from Can., 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,455 (1986) (preliminary
determination).
31. The statute does not use this phrase. Instead, it provides the following, nonex-
haustive list of possible domestic subsidy practices:
(I) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations.
(II) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(III) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
(IV) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, produc-
tion, or distribution.
19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(I)-(IV) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
32. The statute is somewhat schizophrenic in its use of market benchmarks for the
valuation of subsidies. As suggested in the text, the benchmark for ascertaining the
existence and magnitude of any subsidy under a loan program is the market interest
rate. But if the government program involves the provision of goods or services, the
statute looks not to the prevailing market price of those goods and services, but to the
existence of "preferential rates" in the government pricing structure. Id.
§ 1677(5)(A)(ii)(II).
For example, if a national government sells oil to all domestic users at $10/barrel
below the world market price, no subsidy is present because no buyer receives a prefer-
ential price. If the government charges the world market price to all industries except
the widget industry, however, a subsidy to that industry exists in the amount of the price
differential. See id.
The analysis changes if the commodity that is sold by the government is consumed
by only a single "group" of industries-for example, a petroleum by-product with lim-
ited end uses. Then, a subsidy may be found even if the government does not offer a
preferential price to particular purchasers. Depending upon the circumstances, the
value of the subsidy may once again be calculated with reference to market benchmarks.
See Carbon Black from Mex., 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,272-73 (1986) (Preferentiality
Appendix).
33. Certain Textile Mill Prods. from Mex., 50 Fed. Reg. 10,824 (1985).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1982).
1989] 205
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offset by the costs of another, for example, or by excise, sales or other
tax payments that are unrelated to the program under investigation."5
If the ITA determines that an export or a domestic subsidy exists,
it calculates a countervailing duty to offset the subsidy.3 6 The duty will
equal the aggregate amount of all subsidy payments divided by the
value (ad valorem duty) or volume (specific duty)3 7 of the production
that benefited from the subsidy.38
B. The Analysis of Injury
A considerable percentage of countervailing duty cases include an
injury analysis by the ITC.39 The injury test requires the ITC to deter-
35. The definition of "net subsidy" under U.S. law omits any allowances for such
adjustments. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
36. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(1) (1982).
37. Most countervailing duties are ad valorem; specific duties are sometimes used for
administrative convenience when the imports in question are already subject to specific
duties under the U.S. tariff schedules.
38. This calculation ordinarily relies upon data for the last complete fiscal year of
the subsidy program. To illustrate, suppose that in fiscal 1986 the widget producers of
Timbuktu receive $10 from the government for every widget that they produce, for a
total of $1 million in payments on $10 million worth of production. The specific coun-
tervailing duty would equal $10 per widget. The ad valorem countervailing duty would
equal 1076. Any duties ultimately paid on the basis of this calculation are provisional:
after a year or two, the ITA will conduct an "administrative review" to ascertain the
export subsidies actually received during the period covered by the review, and recom-
pute the countervailing duty. Any overpayment is refunded, and the importer of record
is liable for any underpayment. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671e, 1675 (West 1980 & Supp. 4
Dec. 1988).
The duty calculation may be considerably more difficult than it sounds. A govern-
ment grant for capital construction, for example, provides benefits that are deemed to
extend over the life of the capital equipment. Thus, the "value" of a subsidy during the
fiscal year that is used as the basis for the duty calculation will depend upon the method
that is chosen to allocate benefits over time. The ITA has developed elaborate rules to
determine when to allocate benefits over time and how to do so when required. See
Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Prods. from Argen., 49 Fed. Reg. 18,006,
18,016-20 (1984) (Subsidies Appendix).
39. Procedurally, the injury investigation has two stages. See 19 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1671b, 1671d (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988). The "preliminary" investigation,
which occurs before the investigation of subsidization by the ITA, entails a determina-
tion by the ITC "whether there is a reasonable indication that ... an industry in the
United States is ... materially injured.., or... threatened with material injury .. , by
reason of imports of the merchandise" under investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). The "reasonable indication" standard is understood to establish a
fairly low threshold for an affirmative determination, and most preliminary injury deter-
minations are affirmative. See American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994,
999-1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The rare negative determination, however, terminates the
investigation at both agencies. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The "final" injury investigation occurs subsequent to the investigation of subsidiza-
tion by the ITA. Id. § 167 1d(b)(2)-(3). This final investigation is, of course, unneces-
sary if the ITA has determined that the imports in question are not subsidized. But if
the ITA determination is affirmative, the ITC must determine whether a domestic indus-
try is "materially injured, or is threatened with material injury" due to the subsidized
[Vol. 89:199
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mine whether the domestic industry that competes with the imports at
issue is "materially injured or... is threatened with material injury...
by reason of" the imports that were found to be subsidized by the
ITA.40 One might interpret this language to require the ITC to deter-
mine whether foreign government subsidy practices have provided im-
ports with a significant competitive advantage in the U.S. market-that
is, whether a causal link exists between foreign subsidies and some
"material" decline in the condition of U.S. producers.41 But the lan-
guage of the statute arguably does not require such inquiry. It refers to
injury "by reason of imports," not by reason of countervailable subsi-
dies, and has consequently been interpreted not to require a causal link
between injury and countervailable subsidy practices for an affirmative
injury determination, only a causal link between injury and the "subsi-
dized imports." '42
Some ITC Commissioners nonetheless embrace an approach to in-
jury analysis that does search for a link between subsidization and in-
jury.43 In particular, they assess the impact of "subsidized imports" on
the U.S. industry by supposing counterfactually that the subsidies were
imports. Id. § 1671d(b)(1). The absence of the "reasonable indication" language here
is understood to create a higher threshold for an affirmative determination. See
American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 999.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Injury also exists if "the es-
tablishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded," id.
§ 1671d(b)(1)(B), but such a finding is only rarely the basis for an affirmative injury
determination. See, e.g., Certain Commuter Airplanes from Fr. and Italy, USITC Pub.
1269, Inv. No. 701-TA-174, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1366, 1369-71 (July 1982).
41. Such a test appears to be contemplated by article VI of the GATT: "No con-
tracting party shall levy any ... countervailing duty ... unless it determines that the
effect of the... subsidization.., is such as to cause or threaten material injury ...."
GATT, supra note 13, art. VI(5). The U.S. countervailing duty law was grandfathered
under the GATT, however, and so need not comply with article VI. The Subsidies
Code, by contrast, with which U.S. law purports to comply, is arguably ambiguous on
the need for a causal link between the subsidy and the injury. See Subsidies Code, supra
note 14, art. 6.
42. See, e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Prods. from Spain, USITC Pub. 1331, Inv. No.
701-TA-155, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2030, 2035-36 (Jan. 1983) (prevailing views
of Chairman Eckes and Commissioner Haggart); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Braz.,
Belg., Fr. and Venez., USITC Pub. 1230, Inv. No. 701-TA-148, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec.
(BNA) 1976, 1985-88 (Mar. 1982) (views of Commissioner Stern). The Court of Inter-
national Trade has recently agreed that the ITC need not search for a causal link be-
tween injury and the subsidies under investigation. More precisely, it has held that the
size of the subsidy need not be considered by the Commission in its injury analysis; it
suffices to consider the effects of the "subsidized imports," however small the subsidy
may be. See Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 445,
465-66 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); cf. Hyundai Pipe Co. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 357 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (similar determination in antidumping
case).
43. See, e.g., Certain Elec. Conductor Aluminum Redraw Rod from Venez., USITC
Pub. 2103, Inv. No. 701-TA-287 (Aug. 1988) (views of Vice Chairman Brunsdale); Cer-
tain Brass Sheet and Strip from Japan and the Neth., USITC Pub. 2099, Inv. No. 731-
TA-379 (July 1988) (dissenting views of Commissioner Cass) (dumping investigation
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eliminated. 44 They then estimate the consequences for the prices and
volume of imports and the resulting prices and output of competing
domestic products.45 If the elimination of the subsidies would "materi-
ally" benefit U.S. producers of competing products, then the subsidized
imports will be found to have caused material injury. Such analysis re-
lies heavily upon information about the size of the subsidies, the elastic-
ity of import supply, the elasticities of domestic demand and supply,
and so on.46
The more traditional injury analysis, which does not search for a
causal link, also follows a reasonably familiar pattern. First, the Com-
missioners inquire whether "material injury" or threat thereof is pres-
ent at all in the domestic industry.47 That is, if the industry is doing
sufficiently well according to most indicators of its condition, such as
profitability, output, prices, employment, and wages, a negative deter-
mination may be warranted.48
When injury is present, the analysis of causation involves in part a
search for simple correlations in the data. Thus, the Commissioners
will often inquire whether the volume of subsidized imports increased
at a time when the indicia of overall U.S. industrial performance de-
clined. If such an inverse correlation is present, they will likely draw
the inference that subsidized imports are a "cause" of the problem; if
the correlation is absent, imports are less likely to be identified as a
"cause" of injury.49 The traditional causation analysis also focuses on
whether the subsidized imports are depressing the price of domestic
products. The Commissioners search for anecdotal evidepce of indi-
vidual sales lost to import competition and especially for evidence of
"price undercutting" by imports-evidence that imports are priced
cheaper in the marketplace than domestic products.50 Finally, they
consider arguments that factors other than imports are entirely respon-
sible for the injury. For example, perhaps a price leader in the domes-
illustrative of the approach of Commissioner Cass to injury analysis in both dumping
and countervailing duty investigations).
44. E.g., Certain Brass Sheet and Strip, USITC Pub. 2099, Inv. No. 731-TA-379, at 63.
45. E.g., id. at 64.
46. E.g., id. at 71-72.
47. See, e.g., Welded Steel Wire Fabric from Italy, Mex. and Venez., USITC Pub.
1795, Inv. No. 701-TA-261(A), 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1537, 1540-42 (Jan.
1986); Lamb Meat from N.Z., USITC Pub. 1534, Inv. No. 701-TA-214, 6 Int'l Trade
Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1781, 1783-86 (June 1984).
48. See, e.g., Welded Steel, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) at 1538-39.
49. See, e.g., Stainless Steel Prods. from W. Ger., Fr. and the U.K., USITC Pub.
1391, Inv. No. 731-TA-92, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1630, 1633-37 (June 1983);
Leather Wearing Apparel from Uru., USITC Pub. 1144, Inv. No. 701-TA-68, 2 Int'l
Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 5625, 5627 (May 1981).
50. See, e.g., Iron Constr. Castings from Braz., India and China, USITC Pub. 1838,
Inv. No. 701-TA-249, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2216, 2222 (Apr. 1986); Certain
Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Prods. from Korea, USITC Pub. 1634, Inv. No. 701-TA-218,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1598, 1601 (Jan. 1985).
[Vol. 89:199208
HeinOnline  -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  208 1989
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
tic industry is responsible for reducing domestic prices, 51 or imports
from some country not under investigation caused the difficulties ex-
perienced by domestic firms. 5 2
A negative injury determination terminates the proceeding. An af-
firmative injury determination, which requires an affirmative vote by
three of the six Commissioners, 53 results in the issuance of a final coun-
tervailing duty order by the ITA directing the U.S. Customs Service to
collect countervailing duties at the border on the subsidized
merchandise.5 4
II. TRADE POLICY AND THE GOAL OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Unquestionably, competition from overseas producers can disad-
vantage domestic producers, just as competition from domestic produ-
cers can disadvantage other domestic producers. Firms may fail as a
result of this competition, and workers may lose theirjobs. Despite the
economic dislocation that may result from competition in the market-
place, however, competition is usually thought to be desirable for its
ability to promote efficient resource allocation. It drives inefficient pro-
ducers from the market and induces workers to move to firms and in-
dustries in which their services are most valuable. As a result, goods
and services are produced at minimum cost, and prices to consumers
decline. 5 5
These benefits of competition arise whether the competition is for-
eign or domestic. Competition from abroad, in particular, encourages
each nation to specialize in the production of goods and services that it
can supply relatively more efficiently than other nations-the principle
of comparative advantage.5 6 This process of specialization and the at-
tendant flow of goods and services in international commerce benefits
all trading countries since it reduces costs of production and allows
consumers to purchase goods and services at lower prices.
5 7
In many cases, these benefits of international competition to each
trading nation remain when competition from foreign firms in the
home market takes the form of subsidized imports. And, as the analysis
51. See Certain Table Wine from W. Ger., Fr. and Italy, USITC Pub. 1771, Inv. No.
701-TA-258, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2645 (Oct. 1985).
52. See Potassium Chloride from Isr. and Spain, USITC Pub. 1592, Inv. No. 303-
TA-15, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1112, 1116 (Nov. 1984).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1982).
54. Id. § 1671d(c)(1).
55. See, e.g., J. Henderson & R. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory 292-93 (3d ed.
1980); E. Mansfield, Microeconomics 468-71 (5th ed. 1985).
56. For elementary discussions of the principle of comparative advantage and the
gains from trade under competitive conditions, seeJ. Bhagwati & T. Srinivasan, Lectures
on International Trade 152-70 (1983); P. Lindert, International Economics 16-23,
45-51 (8th ed. 1986).
57. SeeJ. Bhagwati & T. Srinivasan, supra note 56, at 30-33; P. Lindert, supra note
56, at 16-23.
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will suggest, even when subsidized import competition is potentially
contrary to the national economic interest, countervailing duties are
rarely, if ever, the appropriate policy response in theory or in practice.
Any such conclusion must rest, of course, upon some assumption
about the proper criteria for evaluating the merits of countervailing
duty policy. For the most part, the analysis to follow assumes that the
pursuit of domestic economic efficiency is the proper goal of U.S. inter-
national trade policy in general, and that it should guide the policy re-
sponse to foreign subsidy practices in particular. Unless otherwise
indicated, the "efficiency" of resource allocation will be measured by
the sum of U.S. producer surplus (the economic profits and other eco-
nomic rents58 earned by domestic firms and workers), U.S. consumer
surplus (the excess of consumer willingness-to-pay over the consumer
price of goods and services), and U.S. "government surplus" (tariff rev-
enue). A policy that maximizes the sum of U.S. producer, consumer,
and government surplus relative to alternative policies is said to be "ef-
ficient" 59 and a policy that increases or decreases that sum relative to
the status quo is said to be "welfare-enhancing" or "welfare-reducing,"
respectively. 60
To many, the proposition that the goal of economic efficiency
should guide U.S. trade policy will not be controversial. 6 ' Others, how-
ever, may wonder whether trade policy should promote goals unrelated
to efficiency, such as a more equitable distribution of wealth. The nor-
mative approach of the analysis therefore warrants a brief discussion.
Beyond question, domestic firms that compete with subsidized im-
58. An "economic rent" is a payment to a factor of production in excess of the
amount required to retain that factor of production in its present use. If a worker earns
a wage in his current position that exceeds the wage (or utility equivalent) that is avail-
able in his next best alternative employment, for example, the excess is an economic
rent.
59. More precisely, policy A is more efficient than policy B if those who prefer A to
B can compensate those who prefer B to A and remain better off themselves, whether or
not such compensation actually occurs-the potential compensation criterion. For an
exposition, see E. Mansfield, supra note 55, at 482; H. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis
268-76 (2d ed. 1984).
60. When national surplus is maximized, goods and services will be produced at
minimum cost, and resources will be allocated to their most valuable uses. H. Varian,
supra note 59, at 270-75.
61. Conceivably, the goal of U.S. trade policy might be the pursuit of worldwide
economic efficiency rather than domestic economic efficiency. The two goals are often
consistent, especially when strategic interaction among trading nations is taken into ac-
count. See, e.g., infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text (discussing tariffs to extract
monopsony rents); infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text (discussing profit-shift-
ing subsidies). Where tension between worldwide and domestic economic welfare arises
in the design of trade policy, however, the analysis assumes that U.S. trade policy will
not sacrifice the interests of domestic producers and consumers even if the gains abroad
would exceed the losses domestically. Cf. infra notes 203-17 and accompanying text
(discussing countervailing duties to deter inefficient subsidies that injure only the subsi-
dizing country).
[Vol. 89:199
HeinOnline  -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  210 1989
COUNTER VAILING DUTY LAW
ports may suffer financial difficulties as a result of such competition,
resulting in lost profits and unemployment in the workforce. Thus,
competition from subsidized imports may lead to serious economic
hardship for workers and their families, a hardship that society may
wish to ameliorate. The hardship that results from competition with
subsidized imports, however, is no different from the hardship that can
result from competition with unsubsidized imports or indeed from
competition with domestic firms; the burdens of unemployment and
economic dislocation are the same whatever causes them. For this rea-
son, individuals dislocated by import competition, "subsidized" or not,
arguably should enjoy no greater entitlement to government assistance
than the victims of other competition; they should enjoy the benefits of
the public safety net programs available to all displaced workers, and
no more.
But a counterargument exists. Many workers displaced by import
competition, particularly those with skills not readily transferable to
other industries, may suffer greater hardship than other displaced
workers. When domestic firms fail as a result of competition from
other domestic firms, for example, the demise of one domestic firm is
typically accompanied by the expansion or creation of another (more
competitive) domestic firm in the same line of business. Displaced
workers may then have an opportunity to secure alternative employ-
ment that draws upon their existing skills and training, perhaps even in
the same geographic area. The same cannot be said of workers dis-
placed by import competition since relocation to find employment
overseas is rarely an attractive or a viable option.
Similarly, when workers are displaced by cyclical downturns in the
domestic economy, they may at least anticipate that the displacement is
temporary and that they will eventually be able to return to work in a
position that draws upon their existing human capital. In the interim,
the public safety net program that typically pays the greatest benefits,
unemployment insurance, will provide assistance. Workers displaced
by import competition, by contrast, may have less hope of returning to
work in the same industry, and thus confront a choice between retrain-
ing themselves for a new line of work or accepting employment in un-
skilled positions.6 2
This observation perhaps justifies programs of special assistance
for workers who are displaced by import competition and whose skills
are not readily transferable to other industries. The more difficult
question is whether trade restrictions are ever the best way to deliver
such assistance.
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that the hardship of eco-
62. But see Richardson, Trade Adjustment Assistance under the United States
Trade Act of 1974: An Analytical Examination and Worker Survey, in Import Competi-
tion and Response 321 (J. Bhagwati ed. 1982) (empirical study questioning the accuracy
of hypothesis in text).
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nomic dislocation is usually better alleviated with tools other than re-
strictive trade policies. 63 Retraining programs, public employment
agencies, and the like can often reduce periods of unemployment and
move workers to alternative positions in which their services can be uti-
lized efficiently. Special "adjustment assistance" programs can and do
provide added relocation and retraining assistance to workers displaced
by import competition. 64 Economists have long maintained that such
programs can reduce the hardships of economic dislocation at lower
cost to the economy than protectionist policies. Such programs not
only create fewer short run allocative inefficiencies than do restrictive
trade policies, but they also encourage the movement of resources to
higher valued uses in the long run.
Protection, by contrast, impedes the efficient reallocation of re-
sources. 65 Furthermore, protection is an exceptionally clumsy method
of redistribution. Many of the benefits are captured not by the dis-
placed workers, but by wealthy stockholders in the companies that re-
ceive protection and workers who would have retained their jobs in the
absence of protection. Other methods of redistribution are superior
because they provide aid directly to needy individuals.
Thus, the proposition that trade policy should pursue economic
efficiency without regard to distributional consequences does not nec-
essarily imply that the government should leave dislocated workers to
fend for themselves. Rather, it implies an assumption, well-supported
in the economic literature, that policies other than protection can alle-
viate any distributional inequities more effectively and more cheaply.6 6
But again, a plausible counterargument exists. Although duties or
other forms of protection assuredly impose net costs on the economy,
the taxes to finance alternative means of redistribution can themselves
create considerable distortions.67 More importantly, the federal, state
63. See, e.g.,J. Bhagwati & T. Srinivasan, supra note 56, at 212-14; R. Lawrence &
R. Litan, Saving Free Trade 12-33 (1986). For an interesting formal treatment of some
of the tensions between efficiency and distributional objectives in trade policy, and how
best to resolve them, see Diamond, Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and In-
come Distribution, in Import Competition and Response, supra note 62, at 123; see also
Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. Pa-
pers and Proc. 414, 417 (1981) (suggesting that redistribution through progressive taxa-
tion is less costly than redistribution through inefficient legal rules).
64. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2272-2294 (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
65. E.g., R. Lawrence & R. Litan, supra note 63, at 22.
66. The problem of adjustment to import competition may raise efficiency issues as
well as distributional issues-at times the costs of adjustment may outweigh the benefits
of lower import prices. If so, protective measures may have some appeal as a "second-
best" response to the problem of adjustment costs. See infra notes 109-40 and accom-
panying text.
67. By itself, this point is not terribly compelling. One can view protection as a way
of providing aid to needy individuals (workers in the protected industry) that is financed
by a tax (duty) on the consumption of a particular good. Given all of the alternative
ways to finance the same amount of aid to the same individuals through income, con-
[Vol. 89:199
HeinOnline  -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  212 1989
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LA W
and local bureaucracies that administer other redistributive programs
may be relatively expensive to operate and may themselves consume
much of the budget for redistribution. The administrative costs of im-
posing additional duties at the border through the Customs Service,
coupled with the attendant deadweight losses in the protected markets,
might be modest by comparison and thus in some cases tip the balance
in favor of redistribution through protection.
In the end, therefore, theory alone cannot establish conclusively
that protection is an inefficient means of redistribution, at least in rela-
tion to the politically and bureaucratically feasible alternatives. That
proposition can only be established through empirical research into the
actual costs associated with the viable options for redistribution. Yet
definitive empirical evidence is lacking. 68 Consequently, the analysis to
follow will briefly consider whether countervailing duties might reason-
ably be used to accomplish distributional goals, assuming arguendo that
protection is sometimes a sensible policy instrument for that purpose.
69
The remainder of the analysis is limited to the question whether coun-
tervailing duties can be used to enhance the efficiency of resource
allocation.
III. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES UNDER CONDITIONS
OF PERFECT COMPETITION
Subsidies70 arise for a variety of reasons and have a variety of con-
sumption, or other taxes, it is most improbable that the duty is the most efficient method
of raising the necessary revenue. See W. Corden, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare
43-45 (1974).
68. A considerable amount of empirical research on the costs of protection has
been done, and this research indeed suggests that protection is an exceptionally costly
way to assist workers displaced or threatened with displacement by import competition.
One recent study suggests, for example, that the annual deadweight loss per U.S. job
saved as a result of restrictions on U.S. imports of Japanese automobiles is $226,000.
See, e.g., R. Lawrence & R. Litan, supra note 63, at 31; see also Tarr & Morkre, Aggre-
gate Costs to the United States of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports, in The New Protec-
tionist Threat to World Welfare 216, 221 (D. Salvatore ed. 1987). Most of the
deadweight loss to the U.S. economy reflected in this and similar studies, however, re-
sults from the use of quotas or voluntary restraint agreements that permit foreign pro-
ducers to capture the "quota rents" (the difference between the elevated U.S. price and
the price overseas) associated with protection. When protection is structured instead as
a tariff (or the quota rights are auctioned), and assuming no retaliation for the loss of
quota rents by foreign countries (a bold assumption), the deadweight loss to the U.S.
economy from protection may be reduced considerably. Furthermore, none of these
studies compare the costs of redistribution through protection to the costs of feasible
alternatives for achieving the same redistribution. Consequently, the empirical evidence
on the costs of redistribution through protection relative to the costs of alternative
means of redistribution is, at least arguably, inconclusive.
69. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
70. In the analysis to follow, the term "subsidy" encompasses any government pro-
gram or practice that provides assistance to business on terms other than those freely
available in the market. This notion of "subsidy" is broader than the definition of "sub-
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sequences for the subsidizing country. Subsidies can correct market
failures and enhance economic welfare in the subsidizing country, or
can distort resource allocation and reduce the subsidizing country's
economic welfare. 71 They can also enhance or reduce worldwide eco-
nomic welfare.72 Much of the existing literature on the international
discipline of subsidy practices devotes considerable attention to the
question whether these various categories of subsidies can be reliably
distinguished.73 From the perspective of a country that imports the
subsidized merchandise, however, these distinctions are often of no
consequence. Specifically, if product and input markets in the import-
ing country are perfectly competitive and adjust quickly to any dise-
quilibrium, a subsidy will enhance the economic welfare of the
importing country whatever the effect of the subsidy on the welfare of
the subsidizing country or on the welfare of the world as a whole.74
In contrast, countervailing duties will often reduce the welfare of
the importing country. The principal caveat to this last proposition is
that duties may improve the "terms of trade" 75 for the importing coun-
try. A second caveat relates to the question whether countervailing du-
ties may deter subsidization altogether and thereby confer benefits on
sidy" under U.S. law, and is adopted here to facilitate discussion of the widest possible
range of government practices.
71. See J. Henderson & R. Quandt, supra note 55, at 304-08 (discussing use of
taxes and subsidies to correct market failures).
72. See Barcelo, supra note 12, at 786-94.
73. See, e.g., id. at 782-84; Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12, at 835.
74. Some readers may wonder whether perfect competition is an interesting case to
analyze. If the market for the goods in question is "competitive" in the sense that mar-
ginal producers around the world are unable to sustain supracompetitive prices or to
earn supracompetitive profits, then why would a foreign country bother to initiate subsi-
dies in the first place? Subsidies in such a market will simply induce entry to the point
where marginal producers earn the same competitive rate of return that they would earn
in the absence of the subsidy. Thus, the argument might run, it is irrational to subsidize
producers in a competitive market.
This analysis is misguided for two reasons. First, even if entry into a competitive
market will ultimately fully erode the benefits of any subsidy in the long run, transitory
benefits to incumbent producers do exist in the short run. Second, even in competitive
industries, subsidies can provide the owners of scarce factors of production with a long-
term increase in rents. For example, if arable land is scarce and the opportunities to
bring new land of comparable quality into production are limited, then farm subsidies
can increase the value of farm land for as long as the subsidies remain in place-to put it
another way, subsidies can increase inframarginal rents. Finally, the government's ob-
jection in initiating a subsidy program may have nothing to do with a desire to provide
producers with rents-the purpose of the subsidy may simply be to increase (or sustain)
output and employment in a politically powerful industry, for example, or to increase
foreign exchange earnings from exports. Indeed, many subsidy programs in the United
States and elsewhere seem to be directed toward competitive industries. For example,
agricultural products are subject to the largest share of export subsidies. P. Lindert,
supra note 56, at 181.
75. "Terms of trade" refers to the relative prices of imports and exports for a trad-
ing nation. An improvement in the terms of trade means that imports have become
relatively less expensive.
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producers in the importing country who must compete with subsidized
goods in their export markets.
The cases in which countervailing duties might in theory generate
a net benefit to the economy, however, are difficult to identify in prac-
tice. Moreover, even if the cases of potential benefit could be reliably
identified, a systematic effort to impose duties in those cases might well
result in a retaliatory or strategic response by trading partners that
would eliminate the gains. Finally, the costs to the government of ad-
ministering the countervailing duty laws, as well as the rent-seeking ex-
penditures of domestic producer groups seeking to avail themselves of
protection, can be considerable. These costs weigh further against any
type of countervailing duty policy.
It is even more clear that the existing U.S. countervailing duty laws
cannot be explained or justified as a mechanism for the imposition of
welfare-enhancing duties in competitive markets. Existing law largely
ignores the factors that would be essential to ascertain the welfare con-
sequences of duties, and the central features of existing law-the spe-
cial treatment of export subsidies, the specificity test, the injury test,
and so on-have little or no bearing on the welfare effects of duties in a
competitive setting. Thus, a net gain to the economy under existing
law can arise only by chance. In short, the economic case for applying
any type of countervailing duty policy in competitive markets, let alone
existing U.S. policy, appears quite weak.
These conclusions follow from a careful analysis of the effects of
countervailing duty policy in both the U.S. home market and in U.S.
export markets. Indeed, the effects of a countervailing duty on U.S.
economic welfare will often be determined entirely by its effects in the
U.S. home market. But if a countervailing duty leads the subsidizing
country to abandon or curtail its subsidy program, or otherwise affects
market prices overseas, and if U.S. firms export to those overseas mar-
kets, then the effects of the duty on U.S. exporters must also be
considered.
A. Effects Within the U.S. Market
In analyzing the effects of a countervailing duty on U.S. economic
welfare, it is helpful to begin the anaysis by considering a simple model
containing one importing and one exporting country.7 6 The analysis
76. In the interest of simplicity, the analysis is limited to "partial equilibrium analy-
sis"-it considers only the effect of subsidies and duties in the markets for the product
directly affected by them and ignores any "spillover" effects into markets for other prod-
ucts. Partial equilibrium methods are unsatisfactory for many topics in the economics of
international trade and, as a consequence, general equilibrium models dominate much
of the theoretical work in this field. For present purposes, however, partial equilibrium
analysis is adequate since a countervailing duty ordinarily affects only one product from
one country, and it is reasonable to assume that the general equilibrium effects of such
19891
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can then be extended to the case of multicountry trade. In both cases,
the essential conclusions remain the same.
1. Two-Country Trade.-Consider a perfectly competitive market in
which imported and domestic products are perfect substitutes.77 For
the moment, assume that all U.S. imports of the product under consid-
eration come from a single country, say, Canada.78 Assume further
that all Canadian exports of the product at issue enter the U.S. mar-
ket.79 Finally, assume for simplicity that U.S. producers of the product
do not export.8 0
a. Perfectly Elastic Import Supply.-Figure I depicts a market in which
the supply of imports Si(1) is perfectly elastic81 at a price P up to and
beyond the quantity of imports demanded in equilibrium. In other
words, any capacity constraint that might turn the supply curve upward
will not be reached. The domestic supply curve, S& is upward slop-
ing.82 The domestic demand curve is given by D. Market equilibrium
duties are small and do not alter the welfare conclusions derived in the partial equilib-
rium framework.
Thus, partial equilibrium models are frequently used to analyze the welfare conse-
quences of tariffs (such as countervailing duties) that are limited to a single market. E.g.,
P. Kenen, The International Economy 17-19, 175-77 (1985); P. Lindert, supra note 56,
at 129-31. For a simple general equilibrium model that develops a novel justification
for countervailing duties, however, see Feenstra, Trade Policy with Several Goods and
'Market Linkages,' 20 J. Int'l Econ. 249, 252-64 (1986) (welfare effect of small duty
turns on degree of substitutability or complementarity between subsidized and unsub-
sidized goods in exporting and importing countries because subsidies and counter-
vailing duties affect terms of trade for complements and substitutes).
77. The essential conclusions of the analysis to follow apply equally to markets in
which imported and domestic products are imperfect substitutes as long as firms are
price takers. Of course, imperfect substitutability may create a degree of market power
for some firms. See infra notes 141-202 and accompanying text.
78. Either Canada is the sole supplier of the product in world markets or, more
probably, transport costs are prohibitive for imports from other possible sources. These
conditions frequently hold in practice. For example, Canada is the only significant
source for U.S. imports of live hogs, fresh raspberries, several kinds of fresh fish, soft-
wood lumber, and a number of other products. See, e.g., Live Swine and Pork from
Can., USITC Pub. 1733, Inv. No. 701-TA-224, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2285,
2291 (July 1985).
79. Again, the explanation would probably lie with transport costs.
80. Thus, for the moment, the analysis need not consider the effects of subsidies
and countervailing duties on the surplus earned by U.S. exporters in their overseas mar-
kets. That analysis is provided at infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
81. The elasticity of import supply describes the responsiveness of the quantity of
imports supplied to changes in price. See W. Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory 361
(3d ed. 1985). If the supply of imports is perfectly elastic at price P, then at that price
any quantity of imports will be supplied. At a price below P, however, no imports will be
supplied at all. Thus, a perfectly elastic import supply curve is drawn as a horizontal line
at price P.
82. The analysis extends readily to markets in which the domestic supply curve is
perfectly elastic, but such markets hold little interest. Domestic producer surplus is zero
in such markets, and hence domestic producers have little incentive to seek protection
from import competition.
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Suppose that the government of Canada offers its producers a sub-
sidy8 3 that lowers their costs of production and causes the import sup-
ply curve to shift downward to Si (2) by an amounts -it is now perfectly
elastic at a price (P - s). 84 The new equilibrium price is then (P - s);
domestic production falls to Q2, and imports rise to Q°* - Q2.
Despite the decline in domestic production, U.S. economic welfare
has plainly increased as a resuli of the subsidy. Before the subsidy, con-
83. The analysis is identical whether the subsidy is a domestic subsidy or an export
subsidy.
84. Not all "subsidies" will have such a simple and direct effect on the import sup-
ply curve. Indeed, some subsidies may have no effect on the import supply curve. This
observation is central to a recent critique of the way that countervailing duties are calcu-
lated by the ITA. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 23. In general, the
import supply curve will not shift by precisely the per-unit-amount of the subsidy. See
Schmitz & Sigurdson, Stabilization Programs and Countervailing Duties: Canadian Hog
Exports to the United States 4-5 (Mar. 1988) (unpublished manuscript on file at Colum-
bia Law Review).
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sumer surplus85 is abP, and producer surplus is Phg. After the subsidy,
producer surplus declines to (P - s)fg, but consumer surplus increases
to ac (P - s). The net increase in economic welfare is given byjhbc.
Finally, suppose the United States imposes a countervailing duty
equal to s per unit of imports to offset the effect of the subsidy. That a
duty of precisely this amount would not in general be imposed under
existing law is unimportant because the qualitative effects of the duty
on U.S. welfare are the same whatever the size of the duty. From the
perspective of U.S. consumers and producers, the effect of the duty is
to shift the import supply curve back to its original position, and to
restore the market equilibrium at P. Consumer surplus is again abP,
and domestic producer surplus is Phg. Tariff revenue to the U.S. gov-
ernment is hbde.
Obviously, U.S. economic welfare is greater than before the sub-
sidy program by the amount of the tariff revenue.8 6 But economic wel-
fare was even greater before the imposition of the countervailing
duty-the net loss as a result of the duty is given by the two trianglesfeh
and bdc.8 7 A countervailing duty under these conditions, or any other
duty for that matter, assuredly reduces welfare.
b. Imperfectly Elastic Import Supply.-The analysis is more complex if
the import supply curve is upward sloping.88 In Figure II, Si (1) is the
import supply curve before the subsidy. The total supply to the U.S.
market, S,(1), is the horizontal sum of Si(1) and the domestic supply
curve, Sd. Initial market equlibrium is at price P1, with domestic pro-
duction of Q, and imports of Q* - Qj. Consumer surplus is abP; pro-
ducer surplus is Pihg.
The subsidy shifts the import supply curve downward by the
amounts to Si (2), and shifts total supply downward to S, (2). At the new
equilibrium price, P2, domestic production is Q,, and imports are Q° -Q. Consumer surplus increases to acP2, while domestic producer sur-
plus falls to Pig. The net gain in surplus to the U.S. economy is the
areajhbc.
To this point, the analysis closely parallels the analysis of Figure I.
85. The use of the Marshallian demand curve, D, to measure consumer surplus as-
sumes that the marginal utility of income for consumers is constant. Otherwise, the area
defined by abP is not a precise measure of consumer surplus, but is still a useful approxi-
mation. See H. Varian, supra note 59, at 263-68; Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without
Apology, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 589 (1976).
86. Indeed, this fact may prompt Canada to discontinue the subsidies. See infra
notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
87. Triangle bdc may be interpreted as a loss of consumer surplus due to the in-
crease in market price. Trianglefeh may be interpreted as a loss of surplus due to the
fact that the marginal costs of production for U.S. producers are greater than the price
of imports for domestic output above Q2.
88. The import supply curve will slope upward if foreign producers suffer decreas-
ing returns to scale as they expand production, or if the cost to them of their input
products increases as production expands. In such a case, import supply is not perfectly
elastic. See supra note 81.
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But now consider the imposition of a countervailing duty in the amount
s per unit of imports. From the perspective of U.S. consumers and pro-
ducers, the import supply curve again shifts back to Si(1), and domestic
consumer and producer surplus are the same as before the subsidy.
Tariff revenue is equal to the rectangle hbde (note that the vertical dis-
tance bd is equal to s, the amount of the duty). As Figure II is drawn,
the countervailing duty increases U.S. economic welfare because the
area of the rectanglejkde exceeds the sum of the trianglesjj-h and bkc.8 9
However, it is also easy to construct a diagram in which the opposite
result emerges.90
89. See Deardorff & Stem, Current Issues in Trade Policy: An Overview, in U.S.
Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy 52-53 (R. Stem ed. 1987) (deriving simi-
lar result regarding welfare consequences of countervailing duty with upward-sloping
import supply curve).
90. For example, Figure II establishes that a countervailing duty reduces welfare if
the import supply curve is flat. It must also reduce welfare if the import supply curve is
sufficiently close to being flat. Intuitively, the price of imports net of the duty will not
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The difference in the effect of the duty on welfare in Figures I and
II arises because the import supply curve in Figure II is upward sloping.
The imposition of the duty reduces U.S. consumption of imports in
both cases, but only in Figure II does reduced consumption of imports
lead to a lower price of imports (net of the duty). In Figure II, there-
fore, the duty shifts the terms of trade in favor of the United States,
making imports relatively less expensive. Part of the tariff revenue then
comes out offoreign producer surplus. 9 1 In Figure I, by contrast, all of
the tariff revenue comes out of domestic consumer surplus.
For a number of reasons, however, the result in Figure II is at best
a dubious justification for the use of countervailing duties and assur-
edly fails as a justification for existing U.S. law. As noted, the revenue
from the duty is in part at the expense of foreign producers. In effect,
the U.S. Treasury appropriates some of the benefits of the subsidy-all
of the benefits in the case of an export subsidy limited to U.S.-bound
exports. The foreign government will surely recognize that counter-
vailing duties absorb part of the subsidy and may respond by curtailing
the subsidy program or abolishing it altogether, a possibility discussed
at length below.92 The market will then return to the equilibrium that
prevailed before the subsidy, which is assuredly worse from the U.S.
perspective than the equilibrium with the subsidy and without the
countervailing duty.93
Moreover, even assuming that the subsidy program would remain
in place, it would be difficult to determine when the net welfare effect of
a countervailing duty would be favorable. A considerable amount of
information would be required in each case to make an empirical com-
parison of "rectangles" and "triangles" as in Figure II, including infor-
mation about demand, domestic supply, import supply, and so on.
Serious errors in the development of that information would be inevita-
ble, and significant costs to assemble the information would be
incurred.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the U.S. countervailing duty laws are
not tailored to exploit the opportunity to impose countervailing duties
under the circumstances depicted in Figure II. The law in no way takes
proper account of the factors that would be necessary to determine
whether a countervailing duty would enhance U.S. welfare by shifting
fall very much, and virtually all of the duty revenue comes out of domestic consumer
surplus rather than foreign producer surplus.
91. This implicitly assumes that foreign productive capacity is owned by foreigners,
not by U.S. investors. To the extent that U.S. investors have a claim on the profits
earned by the foreign producers, the benefits of the duty in Figure II (if any) are
lessened.
92. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
93. For example, in the Canadian softwood lumber case, which involved the largest
volume of trade of any countervailing duty case on record, the Canadian government
elected to raise prices for export lumber in order to avoid the payment of duties to the
United States. See supra note 7.
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the terms of trade in such a way that the increase in government reve-
nue will offset the net decline in the sum of producer and consumer
surplus. Furthermore, a countervailing duty as calculated under ex-
isting law may well reduce U.S. welfare even if a rate of duty exists that
would enhance U.S. welfare.94
Further, it would be ill-advised to modify U.S. law to facilitate the
imposition of duties in cases where the shift in the terms of trade would
generate net benefits. Such "benefits" from the imposition of counter-
vailing duties have nothing to do with the existence or nonexistence of
a foreign "subsidy." A country whose consumers collectively possess
monopsony power in international trade-that is, a country that faces
an upward sloping import supply curve-can always exploit that mo-
nopsony power by imposing a tariff on imports.95 The "optimal" tariff
under these conditions will maximize domestic economic welfare at the
expense of the importing country's trading partners. A danger of such
tariffs, of course, is that if one country imposes duties to exploit its
monopsony power, other countries will do the same. The prospect of
such a degeneration of the international trading system, motivated by
the pursuit of "optimal" tariffs or other policy objectives, underlies the
formation of the GATT system and its considerable (though imperfect)
constraints on tariff increases and other trade restrictions.96
This observation counsels against the use of countervailing duties
to exploit monopsony power. Subsidization is then a mere pretense for
the imposition of duties that are beneficial only because of their effects
upon the terms of trade, and that would be equally beneficial, as a first
approximation, in the absence of subsidization. Thus, the counter-
vailing duty laws would be converted into nothing more than a device
for cheating on international obligations-subsidization becomes an
excuse for the imposition of a tariff that is otherwise impermissible be-
cause of GATT or other international covenants. Trading partners
could not be expected to react passively, but could and quite possibly
would react in kind. Many U.S. exports might then become subject to
countervailing duties97 and the ultimate impact on U.S. economic wel-
94. A duty calculated to offset the subsidy exactly will maximize U.S. welfare only
by coincidence; an alternative rate of duty will almost always do better. See P. Lindert,
supra note 56, at 145. For discussion of the welfare maximizing tariff, see A. Dixit & V.
Norman, Theory of International Trade 150-52 (1980).
95. See J. Bhagwati & T. Srinivasan, supra note 56, at 174-79; P. Lindert, supra
note 56, at 144-47.
96. The formation of GATT was motivated by the need to dismantle trade barriers
erected in the 1920s and 1930s that were perceived to have exacerbated the Great De-
pression and slowed economic recovery. See P. Kenen, supra note 76, at 230-33.
97. Many U.S. government programs arguably confer "subsidies" upon U.S. pro-
ducers. Agriculture-a major source of U.S. exports-is heavily subsidized through
farm programs. Many other industries receive direct or indirect assistance from the
Defense Department and other agencies for research and development. State and local
governments frequently provide below-market loans and other location incentives to
manufacturers. In short, the list of potentially countervailable U.S. "subsidies" is exten-
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fare would be highly ambiguous, at best.98
Concededly, even if existing law does not take account of the fac-
tors necessary to determine whether a countervailing duty will capture
sufficient monopsony rents to enhance U.S. economic welfare in a
given case, and even if modification of the law to facilitate such a deter-
mination would invite retaliation, duties imposed under existing law
may by chance provide a net economic benefit to the United States be-
cause of their effects upon the terms of trade. But the observation that
existing U.S. policy may by chance benefit the United States hardly pro-
vides a compelling rationale for that policy.
2. Multicountry Trade.-Figures I and II are constructed on the as-
sumption that trade in the product at issue is limited to one importing
country and one exporting country. That assumption can be relaxed
without materially changing the implications of the analysis for coun-
tervailing duty policy: circumstances exist in which countervailing du-
ties conceivably lead to a net welfare gain in the U.S., but they are
difficult to identify in practice and in any event existing law is clearly
not designed to exploit those potential gains. Efforts to modify the law
to exploit the opportunities for gains would likely evoke strategic reac-
tions by foreign governments that might well eliminate any gains.
Thus, assume that the United States imports a product from a vari-
ety of countries. Each exporting country has the option of exporting to
the United States, or to a number of other countries around the world.
One exporting country begins to subsidize its domestic producers, and
the United States must decide whether to impose a countervailing duty
on a unilateral basis.
a. Perfectly Elastic Import Supply.-Consider first the case in which
the import supply curve to the United States is perfectly elastic, at least
up to some capacity constraint that will not be reached in equilibrium
(the analogy to Figure I). A subsidy program by a small exporting na-
tion under these conditions will do little or nothing to shift the supply
curve, at least in the short run, assuming that its producers have limited
capacity to expand production. They will simply continue to sell at the
sive. For a survey of some of the U.S. government programs that might be considered
subsidies, see Cooper, Industrial Policy and Trade Distortion, in The New Protectionist
Threat to World Welfare, supra note 68, at 233, 244-49; Cooper, supra note 2, at
107-12.
98. A possible counterargument rests on the observation that countervailing duties
have not been used to a significant extent in the past by nations other than the United
States; thus, perhaps the United States could modify its countervailing duty laws to facil-
itate systematic exploitation of U.S. monopsony power without fear of parallel retalia-
tory actions abroad. Even assuming that the information problems associated with such
a policy could be overcome, however, that argument is probably misguided. The limited
use of countervailing duties at present by U.S. trading partners probably owes in part to
the fact that the existing U.S. countervailing duty laws do not provide systematic benefits
to the United States. Foreign governments thus have little interest in mimicking existing
U.S. law. The situation would change dramatically if U.S. law were revised to facilitate
the systematic capture of monopsony rents.
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world market price and pocket the subsidy as profit. And if the world
market price remains unchanged, consumer and producer surplus in
the United States will be unaffected by the subsidy.
Likewise, the imposition of a unilateral countervailing duty by the
United States under these circumstances is unlikely to affect U.S. eco-
nomic welfare, save for the cost of the countervailing duty proceeding
itself. The subsidizing country will simply redirect its exports to a na-
tion that does not impose a countervailing duty, and the United States
will substitute imports from another source at the world market price.
Of course, if all other importing nations were to impose counter-
vailing duties along with the United States, exporters in the subsidizing
country would be unable to circumvent the duty and would have to ab-
sorb it to remain competitive. In that event, economic welfare in the
importing countries would rise by the amount of the revenue from the
duties, unless the subsidy program were discontinued. But the United
States is the only major trading nation to use countervailing duties sys-
tematically.99 Hence, a countervailing duty by the United States is un-
likely to be matched by other countries, and under the circumstances
hypothesized here, the countervailing duty is unlikely to have any mate-
rial impact on U.S. economic welfare.
This discussion assumes that the subsidizing country is "small"-
that it can respond to a countervailing duty by redirecting its U.S. ex-
ports to other markets at the prevailing world price. If the subsidizing
country has a sufficiently "large" share of trade in the product at issue,
however, either initially or as a result of capacity expansion induced by
the subsidy, it may be unable to sell all of its exports in alternative mar-
kets without lowering the price,100 and U.S. importers may be unable to
secure substitute supplies at the prevailing world price. The latter pos-
sibility is discussed below as it implies that the import supply curve at
some point becomes upward sloping. The former possibility changes
the analysis only slightly.
If the supply of imports from nonsubsidizing countries is perfectly
elastic and the subsidizing country must lower its price if it is to redirect
all of its U.S. exports to other markets, two equilibria are possible. In
the first, the United States ceases to import from the subsidizing coun-
99. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
100. More precisely, suppose for purposes of illustration that transportation costs
to and from all world markets are negligible. Let the U.S. share of worldwide imports
(U.S. imports/imports by all countries) equal x; let the subsidizing country's share of
worldwide exports (subsidizing country's exports/exports by all countries) equal y.
Both x and y are evaluated at the world market price that prevails prior to the introduc-
tion of the subsidy.
Imports by all countries will equal exports by all countries. Thus, with a perfectly
elastic supply of imports in the world market, and assuming that the United States is the
only country to impose a countervailing duty, the subsidizing country will be unable to
circumvent the duty entirely by redirecting its exports to other countries at the prevail-
ing world market price if x + y > 1.
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try altogether. The U.S. price then exceeds the price elsewhere in the
world by an amount no greater than the amount of the duty, and the
U.S. government earns no revenue from the duty. Because the U.S. can
substitute alternative supplies at the prevailing world price, however,
the U.S. price remains constant after the duty. Hence, the duty once
again has no effect on U.S. economic welfare, save the expenditure of
resources on the countervailing duty proceeding.
In the second possible equilibrium, the U.S. price exceeds the
price elsewhere by precisely the amount of the duty, and the subsi-
dizing country continues to supply some portion of the U.S. market.
Here, the U.S. government earns some revenue from the duty. And
because the U.S. price once again remains constant, U.S. economic wel-
fare has increased by the amount of the duty revenue. 10 1
We defer for the moment the question whether this scenario might
justify the use of a countervailing duty. But note that U.S. producers
are unlikely to seek countervailing duties under these circumstances. If
they properly anticipate that duties will have no impact on the U.S.
price, they will have no incentive to file a countervailing duty petition.
The more interesting case to consider, therefore, is the case of an up-
ward sloping import supply curve.
b. Upward Sloping Import Supply.-Assume now that the U.S. import
supply curve is upward sloping. As before, if subsidized producers are
already producing at capacity before the introduction of the subsidy,
the short run effect of the subsidy is simply to increase their profits with
no increase in production and thus no reduction in market prices. But
if the subsidy remains in place over the long run, it is likely to induce
increased output, and the U.S. price, as well as prices in other world
markets, will tend to decline. The magnitude of this decline in prices
depends upon the elasticity of supply in the subsidizing country (how
much additional production the subsidy induces), the elasticity of sup-
ply in other producing countries (how much the production elsewhere
declines in response to a decline in price), and the elasticity of demand
in world markets affected by the subsidized output (how much con-
sumer prices must fall to allow the increased volume of output to be
sold).
If the United States then imposes a countervailing duty, exporters
in the subsidizing country will likely respond by redirecting their ex-
ports to existing and perhaps new export markets in which no counter-
vailing duty is imposed. If demand in these other markets is elastic
enough, the subsidizing country may cease exports to the United States
altogether-it will surely do so if the price received in alternative mar-
kets would be greater than the U.S. market price less the duty.
101. Another possibility is that the subsidizing country expands its productive ca-
pacity so much over time that it can become the sole supplier of imports in its overseas
markets. At that point, the analysis of two-country trade in Figure I becomes directly
applicable.
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Under these conditions, U.S. economic welfare assuredly declines:
when the subsidized supplies are withdrawn from the U.S. market, the
U.S. price rises as import customers must substitute more costly sup-
plies from alternative sources. The resulting decline in consumer sur-
plus assuredly exceeds the increase in producer surplus (recall Figure
II). And because the subsidizing country no longer exports to the
United States, U.S. government revenue from the duty is zero.
In the alternative equilibrium, the subsidizing country does not re-
direct its exports entirely to other markets because the price in those
markets would then fall below the price in the U.S. market by more
than the amount of the countervailing duty. Instead, the subsidizing
country continues to export some of its subsidized output to the United
States, and the U.S. government earns some revenue from the duty.
This circumstance is most likely to arise, for example, when the output
of the subsidizing country is large in relation to the size of the world
market, when demand in markets outside the United States is relatively
inelastic, or when high transport costs preclude economical shipment
of the subsidized merchandise to alternative destinations. The situa-
tion depicted in Figure II is analogous, although imperfectly. As in Fig-
ure II, the U.S. price rises as a result of the duty and the sum of
domestic consumer and producer surplus declines, but the government
earns revenue from the countervailing duty and exporters in the subsi-
dizing country reduce their price (net of the duty) to U.S. importers.
Clearly, the revenue from the duty might more than offset the net
decline in the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 10 2 For example,
suppose that demand in markets outside the United States is highly in-
elastic. Then, the subsidizing country will discover that prices in those
markets fall precipitously as it redirects its exports away from the
United States. Conceivably, demand elsewhere could be so inelastic
that the supply of imports to the U.S. market ultimately declines very
little in response to the duty, and the rise in the U.S. price is very small.
The loss of consumer surplus in the United States is then negligible, yet
duty revenue may be considerable. High transport costs to alternative
markets can produce a similar result.
But for reasons that are familiar from the analysis of two-country
trade,' 08 the theoretical possibility of a net welfare gain to the United
States either in this case or in the case of the perfectly elastic import
supply curve is a dubious justification for the use of a countervailing
duty. A duty may lead to the abolition of the subsidy program, and
102. To establish this proposition formally, it suffices to consider a limiting case.
Assume that demand outside the United States is totally inelastic. Then, the total vol-
ume of imports into the United States will not change at all as a result of the duty, and
the U.S. price will not rise. Consequently, no net decline in the sum of producer and
consumer surplus in the United States will occur, but the U.S. government will earn
some revenue from the duty on imports from the subsidizing country as long as the
subsidy remains in place.
103. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
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thus return the market to the presubsidy equilibrium that is clearly
worse for the United States than the equilibrium with the subsidy but
without the countervailing duty. In addition, any welfare gain occurs
only because the duty shifts the terms of trade against the subsidizing
country and, in effect, exploits the collective monopsony power of U.S.
consumers. The circumstances under which a net gain to the United
States will arise would be quite difficult to identify in practice, and the
existing countervailing duty laws clearly are not designed to identify
those circumstances. Thus, a net gain will arise under existing law only
by chance. Concomitantly, any effort to amend the law to allow the
United States to exploit its monopsony power more systematically
would likely be met with retaliation.
B. Effects Upon U.S. Exports
If U.S. producers do not export the good that is subject to a coun-
tervailing duty, then the analysis above captures all of the partial equi-
librium effects of the duty on U.S. welfare. No account need be taken
of the effects of the duty on U.S. exporters. Yet, in some industries,
both imports and exports may be present.10 4 And, if some U.S. produ-
cers do export prior to the imposition of the countervailing duty, a
number of refinements to the analysis are necessary. The essential con-
clusions, however, remain much the same.
Specifically, if the duty causes the price in the U.S. market to rise
above the price in overseas markets, then some if not all exports from
the United States will be redirected to the U.S. market to take advan-
tage of the higher price. The U.S. producers of the goods now sold in
the U.S. market at a higher price will earn greater surplus than prior to
the imposition of the duty. As before, however, their gain will be more
than offset by a loss of domestic consumer surplus due to the increase
in the domestic price, much as in Figure 1.105 Hence, whether a duty
may cause goods that would otherwise be exported to remain in the
U.S. market does not change the analysis in any important way.
Because of transportation costs or other factors, however, some
U.S. exporters may continue to export after the imposition of the coun-
tervailing duty, even if the market price abroad is, at least in some loca-
tions, lower than the price at home. Then, if the countervailing duty
causes a decline in the price overseas of the good subject to duty, the
price received by U.S. producers on their overseas sales will fall and any
104. Under competitive conditions, a possible explanation is transport costs-it
may at times be cheaper for producers in California to ship to other Pacific Rim coun-
tries than to the East Coast of the United States. Of course, a variety of other explana-
tions exist for "two-way" trade under imperfectly competitive conditions. Conditions of
imperfect competition are addressed infra notes 141-202 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. This discussion again assumes that
the supply curve for goods produced within the United States is upward-sloping.
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surplus on those sales will be reduced. This observation further rein-
forces the case against the imposition of a duty.
But this analysis neglects one possible response of the subsidizing
government to the imposition of a countervailing duty. A counter-
vailing duty may induce the subsidizing country to abandon or to cut
back its subsidy program. If exports from the subsidizing country com-
pete with U.S. exports either in the home market of the subsidizing
country or in a third-country market, U.S. exporters may then benefit
from higher prices in those markets. The resulting increment in U.S.
producer surplus on overseas sales might, in theory, offset the adverse
effects on the U.S. market of the discontinuation of the subsidy.10
Upon reflection, however, this possibility also fails to provide a
persuasive justification for the use of countervailing duties. Even as-
suming that a unilateral countervailing duty induces the subsidizing
country to discontinue its subsidy program, U.S. exporters will enjoy a
significant increment of surplus on overseas sales only if U.S. exports
are significant in quantity and if the conditions of supply and demand
abroad are such that discontinuation of the subsidy program will signif-
icantly increase prices in U.S. export markets. Such a price increase is
unlikely to occur unless the subsidizing country has a significant share
of trade in the product at issue in the relevant markets and the supply
of imports to those markets from alternative sources has considerable
upward slope. The increase in prices abroad will also be constrained by
the elasticity of demand in overseas markets-the more elastic the de-
mand, the less prices will rise. Thus, a significant increase in surplus on
U.S. export sales will only arise under limited circumstances, and the
circumstances in which that increase would offset the welfare loss in the
U.S. market will be even more limited. These circumstances would be
extremely difficult to identify in practice, and are obviously not consid-
ered under existing law as part of the determination whether or not to
impose countervailing duties.
More importantly, there can be no assurance that the response of
foreign governments to countervailing duties will be to reduce or elimi-
nate their subsidies. As a first approximation, the greater the surplus
that U.S. exporters would earn on overseas sales if the subsidy pro-
grams were discontinued, the less likely that a unilateral countervailing
duty would induce the discontinuation of those programs. With re-
spect to export subsidies, this observation is almost self-evident. Other
things being equal, a unilateral countervailing duty seems more likely
106. When the foreign government abandons its subsidy program, the duty will
be lifted. But a loss to U.S. consumers still occurs because they no longer enjoy the
benefits of a lower price due to the subsidy. In addition, a time lag may exist between
discontinuation of the subsidy program and elimination of the duty, thus compounding
the loss to consumers. A duty can only be lifted after "administrative review" by the
Department of Commerce, see 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675 (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988),
which may occur months or even years after a change in policy by the foreign
government.
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to induce discontinuation of the underlying subsidies, the greater the
extent to which the duty results in a transfer of the subsidy payments
from the subsidized foreign producers to the U.S. Treasury. If this
transfer is complete, the subsidy payments have no impact on output,
employment, foreign exchange earnings, or any other variable that the
foreign government seeks to influence through subsidization. And, the
transfer is complete when a countervailing duty applies to an export
subsidy on goods exported to the United States: all of the subsidy pay-
ments, assuming the duty is properly calculated, are captured by the
United States as duty revenues. If the subsidizing country increases its
export subsidy on goods destined for the United States, the duty will
rise accordingly.' 0 7 Thus, it would be irrational for the subsidizing
country to continue to apply the export subsidy program to U.S.
exports.
But the subsidizing country has no reason to modify its export sub-
sidies on goods destined for other markets since such subsidies have no
effect on the rate of duty applicable to its U.S. exports-the United
States has no right under U.S. law or under the GAIT to impose duties
on U.S. imports if foreign subsidies merely benefit goods destined for
third-country markets. Thus, the likely effect of a U.S. duty to offset an
export subsidy is simply to induce the discontinuation of the subsidy on
exports to the United States, with no effect on export subsidies applica-
ble to sales in third-country markets. U.S. exporters will enjoy no price
increase at all on their third-country sales under these conditions, and
U.S. consumers will lose the benefits of the subsidy on goods destined
for the United States.
The analysis is more difficult with respect to countervailing duties
that offset domestic subsidies, but the conclusion is arguably the same.
Once again, the analysis rests on the assumption that a unilateral duty
is more likely to result in discontinuation of the underlying subsidy pro-
gram, the greater the extent to which the duty captures the subsidy for
the U.S. Treasury. Other things being equal, a countervailing duty im-
posed by the United States will capture a greater proportion of the ben-
efits of a domestic subsidy, the greater the extent to which the
production of the subsidizing country is exported to the United States.
But U.S. exporters are most likely to gain substantial surplus from dis-
continuation of a subsidy program when the subsidizing country has a
substantial presence in U.S. export markets-that is, when much of the
subsidizing country's production is not exported to the United States.
Thus, as in the case of export subsidies, a unilateral countervailing duty
to offset a domestic subsidy is perhaps least likely to induce discontinu-
ation of the subsidy program when the benefits, if any, of its discontinu-
ation to U.S. exporters would be the greatest.
Even more importantly, suppose that a countervailing duty would
107. Under U.S. law, countervailing duties are revised periodically to take account
of fluctuations in the level of support under subsidy programs. See supra note 38.
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induce the foreign government to discontinue its domestic subsidy.
The foreign government can nonetheless preserve the competitive po-
sition of its exporters in third-country markets by substituting an ex-
port subsidy applicable only to its sales in those markets. At that point,
the United States cannot impose a countervailing duty because U.S. im-
ports are no longer "subsidized," but U.S. exporters will still confront
"subsidized" competition in third-country markets. Unless the govern-
ments of third countries respond with countervailing duties of their
own, which is unlikely given historical experience,' 08 the imposition of
the countervailing duty will have done little or nothing to add to the
surplus earned on U.S. exports.
IV. DEPARTURES FROM PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE LABOR MARKET:
UNEMPLOYMENT AND ADJUSTMENT COSTS
Although the case for countervailing duties in competitive markets
appears exceedingly weak, the assumptions of the competitive model
plainly do not hold in all industries. One failure in those assumptions
arises when labor markets fail to clear promptly, or clear at a supracom-
petitive wage. Indeed, public support for protectionist measures often
rests on the perception that import competition causes serious eco-
nomic dislocation, such as plant closings and sustained unemployment.
It is possible, at least in theory, that the imposition of countervailing
duties may be justified, either by considerations of efficiency or distri-
butional equity, as a second-best response to the economic dislocation
or "adjustment costs" caused by subsidized import competition. The
existing countervailing duty laws, however, are poorly suited to identify
the circumstances in which the imposition of a duty might be appropri-
ate for these purposes. Furthermore, existing U.S. law provides other
measures more properly suited to address the dislocation and adjust-
ment costs associated with increased import competition.
A. Efficiency Considerations
In the preceding discussion of subsidies and countervailing duties
under conditions of perfect competition, domestic producer surplus
was measured as an area above the domestic supply curve, bounded at
the top by a horizontal line drawn at the prevailing market price.' 0 9
Because the domestic supply curve reflects the marginal costs of pro-
duction for domestic producers, this area captures the amount by which
price exceeds the marginal costs of production for each unit of output,
summed over all units of output that are produced. In other words, it
reflects the amount by which total revenues exceed total variable
costs-a measure of the economic profits and rents earned by the in-
108. See supra note 18.
109. See supra notes 58-60, 76-91 and accompanying text (Figures I and II).
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dustry.110 This measure of producer surplus is inaccurate if the margi-
nal cost of the resources that are employed in the domestic industry
does not equal the return that those resources could earn from alterna-
tive employment.
1. Inefficient Unemployment and Possible Corrective Measures.-Suppose
that the marginal cost of labor to the widget industry is $10 per hour at
all levels of output; firms must pay workers at least that amount to se-
cure their services. The industry supply curve will then reflect a margi-
nal cost of labor valued at $10 per hour. But if the return to widget
workers in alternative employment is, say, only $8 per hour, employ-
ment in the widget industry at $10 per hour provides surplus to work-
ers of $2 per hour that is not captured by the difference between price
and marginal costs of production. The area between the domestic sup-
ply curve and the prevailing market price then understates the true sur-
plus from industry operations. As a general proposition, that area will
understate domestic producer surplus whenever the marginal cost of
any input to the productive process is held above the return that the
input can earn in its best alternative use; that is, whenever marginal
inputs earn a rent."1 '
Under competitive conditions, and in the absence of some external
distortion of marginal input prices, such rents do not arise because
firms can always purchase any input by bidding incrementally more
than the input can obtain in its next best alternative use. If widget
workers can only earn $8 per hour or its equivalent1 12 in alternative
employment, for example, a wage offer of $8.01 will ensure the work-
ers' willingness to work for the widget industry, other things being
equal. And although wages may rise above $8.01 per hour if the de-
mand for labor to produce widgets is strong enough, any such rent will
decline if the demand for labor weakens, thus ensuring that workers
will remain employed in the widget industry as long as the prevailing
wage exceeds $8 per hour. Consequently, the marginal cost of labor, as
reflected in the industry supply curve under competitive conditions,
110. See W. Nicholson, supra note 81, at 403-04; H. Varian, supra note 59, at 268.
111. A word of clarification is in order. If the industry supply curve slopes upward
because an expansion of production causes the prices of inputs to be bid up, in-
framarginal inputs will receive a rent-a payment in excess of the minimum amount that
is necessary to secure the input. Workers who are willing to work for $5 per hour, for
example, may find that they can earn $10 per hour because the demand for labor is
strong. Such rents are captured by the area between the domestic supply curve and the
prevailing market price as long as those rents will decline to zero in response to a suffi-
cient weakening of demand for the input-the industry supply curve will then reflect
marginal costs for each input equal to the return that the input can earn in its next best
alternative use. It is only when rents cannot or do not decline to zero in response to a
sufficient weakening of demand that marginal inputs will earn a rent and producer sur-
plus will be understated.
112. Of course, workers care not only about the wage rate, but about benefits, the
working environment, and so on.
[Vol. 89:199
HeinOnline  -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  230 1989
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
will not exceed the returns available elsewhere to marginal workers.
This will be true for the marginal cost of other inputs as well.
The assumptions of the competitive model may not describe all
input markets accurately, however, especially certain labor markets.
For a variety of reasons, marginal workers may earn a premium over
the returns available in their next best employment alternative. For ex-
ample, one source of rents to marginal workers is unionization. Unions
take advantage of their monopoly position to raise wages above the
competitive level, thus providing all employed members of the union
with a premium over the returns available elsewhere. Another source
of rents to marginal workers is a state-imposed floor for the price of
labor-a ninimum wage. Assuming that the minimum wage exceeds
the market-clearing wage, it will create a pool of workers who are will-
ing to work for the minimum wage or less, but cannot find employment.
The workers who do find employment at the minimum wage earn a
"rent" equal to the amount by which the minimum wage exceeds the
value of their leisure time (since, by hypothesis, unemployment is the
alternative open to them).113
The economic equivalent of rents to marginal workers can also re-
sult from the government transfer payments system. To the extent that
welfare programs, unemployment insurance, 114 or other transfer pro-
grams provide a subsidy to unemployed workers, the private value of
leisure will exceed the social value of leisure. Marginal workers whose
next best alternative activity is leisure will then earn rents measured
with respect to the social value of their next best alternative activity
because their wage must exceed the private value of leisure to attract
them into the workforce.
The observation that the transfer payments system may create the
equivalent of rents to marginal workers suggests that such rents, even if
absent under normal business conditions, may emerge as a result of a
business downturn. In fact, transfer payments and unemployment in-
surance have been suggested as one explanation for a downward "stick-
iness" of real wages-an apparent tendency for real wages to remain
stable in the face of slackening labor demand-which causes unemploy-
ment to rise more than might be expected in an otherwise competitive
labor market."15 Rising unemployment, to the extent attributable to
113. In the United States, minimum wage workers are perhaps most typically em-
ployed in the service industries-cleaning and janitorial services, fast-food establish-
ments, and the like. Thus, the extent to which imports compete with domestic firms that
employ considerable numbers of workers at minimum wage may be quite small.
114. The case of unemployment insurance is actually rather complicated, since un-
employment insurance is by no means a pure transfer program. Much of it is financed
through employer premiums that are experience-rated (albeit imperfectly).
115. See Baily, Wages and Employment Under Uncertain Demand, 41 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 37, 44 (1974); Gordon, The Theory of Domestic Inflation, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 128,
130-31 (1977); Gordon, Recent Developments in the Theory of Inflation and Unem-
ployment, 2 J. Monetary Econ. 185, 205 (1976).
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the transfer payments system, may thus be a signal that "rents" to mar-
ginal workers are emerging. Likewise, truly "involuntary" unemploy-
ment, where it exists, 116 reflects the presence of rents to marginal
workers since it implies a labor market disequilibrium in which unem-
ployed workers have a reservation wage' 17 below the going market
wage for equally productive workers, yet cannot find anyone to hire
them for their reservation wage. 118
Of what significance to trade policy is the fact that some marginal
workers may earn rents? In general, the existence of such rents implies
a labor market equilibrium in which wages are inefficiently high and
employment is inefficiently low. Quite apart from considerations of in-
ternational trade policy, therefore, government intervention might in
theory be justified to cure this inefficiency.
One possible form of intervention is legislation to eliminate the
source of the rent. But the existing political consensus in the United
States would surely block any attempt to abolish minimum wages, elim-
inate transfer payments to the unemployed, or repeal the antitrust ex-
emption for unions. An alternative form of intervention is a wage
subsidy. A properly calculated subsidy could eliminate any disparity
between the private marginal cost of labor and the social marginal cost
of labor. Moreover, because the wage subsidy directly addresses the
source of the market distortion, it is generally a more efficient remedy
for that distortion than other forms of intervention (such as protection
against foreign competition) that can increase employment, but will si-
multaneously introduce other distortions. 91
But a wage subsidy may be politically unacceptable. Moreover, the
task of determining the appropriate rate of subsidy market-by-market
would be extraordinarily difficult and fraught with error, 120 and the
116. To be sure, some economists doubt the existence of genuinely "involuntary
unemployment" outside of markets in which an artificial government or union wage
floor prevents wages from declining to clear the market. See, e.g., Lucas & Rapping,
Real Wages, Employment and Inflation, in Microeconomic Foundations of Employment
and Inflation Theory 257, 272-73 (E. Phelps ed. 1970).
117. A "reservation wage" is defined as the minimum wage that a worker requires
before he will accept employment. E. Dolan, Basic Economics 320 (3d ed. 1983).
118. Recent work in labor economics advances a number of interesting hypotheses
about the reasons for "involuntary" unemployment and the sources of apparent labor
market disequilibrium. A useful collection of essays is found in G. Akerlof &J. Yellen,
Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market (1986).
119. In models of international trade with "sticky wages" (the source of the "sticki-
ness" is typically left unspecified), import competition produces inefficiently high unem-
ployment levels because wages do not decline to clear the labor market. Neglecting the
transaction costs of tax collection and subsidy disbursement, however, a wage subsidy is
a more efficient solution to the problem than import protection. SeeJ. Bhagwati & T.
Srinivasan, supra note 56, at 212-32; H. Johnson, Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs
117-51 (1971); Bhagwati & Srinivasan, The Theory of Wage Differentials: Production
Response and Factor Equalisation, I J. Int'l Econ. 19, 29 (1971).
120. A similar problem, of course, also afflicts alternatives to subsidization such as
protection.
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transaction costs associated with a bureaucracy to compute and dis-
burse wage subsidies might well swamp the benefits of the wage subsidy
as a policy tool. As a result, corrective intervention in the labor market
to address the inefficiencies caused by the existence of rents to margi-
nal workers may not be forthcoming. 12 1
Price
Figure III
I II I
I I
I I
I I
Quantity
This observation raises the question whether trade policy may at
times be a "second-best" solution to such inefficiencies. In particular,
it raises the question whether countervailing duties might at times be
appropriate to prevent an inefficient reduction in employment as a con-
sequence of subsidized competition. Figure III illustrates this possibil-
ity. It is constructed upon the same assumptions as Figure I-two-
country trade, perfectly elastic supply of imports from abroad, upward
sloping domestic supply, and so on. 122 The difference lies in the pres-
121. Obviously, wage subsidy programs are relatively rare in the United States,
although government training programs and other types of assistance to dislocated
workers may have effects similar to those of wage subsidies.
122. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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ence of an "opportunity cost curve," OC, which lies below the domestic
supply curve. 123 The gap between the domestic supply curve, Sd, and
the opportunity cost curve, OC, represents rents to marginal inputs,
most likely labor. 124 Thus, domestic producer surplus must now be
calculated as the area between the prevailing market price and the op-
portunity cost curve.
Prior to the introduction of the subsidy, the import supply curve
Si(1) is horizontal at price P; market equilibrium is thus at price P and
quantity Q*. Domestic production is equal to Q,, and imports are equal
to Q* - Q1. Consumer surplus is given by the area abP, and producer
surplus-now measured with reference to the curve OC-is given by
the area Phfg. Note that this equilibrium is inefficient: domestic pro-
ducer surplus would increase by the area of the triangle hfm if domestic
production could somehow expand to the point at which the curve OC
intersects the horizontal import supply curve at P. An appropriate in-
put subsidy might do the trick but, by hypothesis, such a subsidy pro-
gram is for some reason infeasible.
Now suppose, as in the construction of Figure I, that the foreign
government introduces a subsidy and the import supply curve shifts
downward to Si (2) at the price (P - s). The new market equilibrium at a
price of (P-s) reflects total consumption of Q", with domestic produc-
tion at Q2 and imports of Q**- Q2. Consumer surplus has risen to ac (P-
s), while producer surplus has fallen to (P - s)ijg.
Unlike Figure I, the subsidy is no longer unambiguously beneficial
because only part of the decline in domestic producer surplus-the
area Phfk (P - s)-is captured by domestic consumers. The remainder
of the decline in domestic producer surplus, area ijk, is not. Hence, the
sum of domestic producer and consumer surplus rises or falls as a con-
sequence of the subsidy according to whether the area kjhbc is larger or
smaller than the area ijk. As the diagram is drawn, the subsidy is benefi-
cial, but it is straightforward to construct a diagram in which the sub-
sidy reduces domestic economic. welfare-that is, in which the
adjustment costs to domestic producers exceed the benefits to domes-
tic consumers.1 25
Consider next the effects of a countervailing duty. From the per-
spective of domestic producers and consumers, a duty of s per unit of
imports shifts the import supply curve back to the price P. Domestic
consumer and producer surplus increase to the levels that prevailed
before the introduction of the subsidy, and government revenue from
the duty is given by the area hbde, assuming that the duty does not in-
123. For convenience, the opportunity cost curve is drawn parallel to the supply
curve, but this is not essential.
124. Of course, other factors of production might command rents at the margin as
well, such as an input product sold by a monopolized industry.
125. An alternative diagrammatic treatment may be found in Krugman, The U.S.
Response to Foreign Industrial Targeting, 1984 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity 77, 91.
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duce discontinuation of the subsidy. By comparison to the market
equilibrium after the introduction of the subsidy but before the coun-
tervailing duty, the sum of domestic producer, consumer and govern-
ment surplus rises or falls as a result of the duty according to whether
the sum of areas kfe and bcd is smaller or larger than area #'k. In the
diagram as drawn, the countervailing duty reduces aggregate domestic
welfare. One can easily construct examples in which the duty increases
aggregate domestic welfare. 126
In short, when workers earn rents at the margin and first-best poli-
cies to correct the resulting inefficiency are not available, foreign subsi-
dies conceivably reduce national economic welfare. And even if they
do not, countervailing duties may enhance national economic welfare
quite apart from any effect on the terms of trade: assuming no reaction
by the subsidizing country in the form of retaliation or discontinuation
of the subsidy, duties may generate an increment in producer surplus
and government revenue that exceeds the associated loss of consumer
surplus. Of course, the assumption of passivity on the part of the subsi-
dizing country will not always be accurate.
One further consideration warrants mention: the analysis in Fig-
ure III is static, and the magnitude of any rents at the margin is fixed
regardless of the magnitude of subsidies or duties. In actuality, rents,
or the loss of rents, may change over time, particularly with fluctuations
in the business cycle. Suppose, for example, that an industry suffers a
downturn in the demand for its output because of an increase in import
competition. If the industry is heavily unionized, unemployment may
rise because a majority of union members initially vote to reject wage
concessions. Similarly, if the industry employs a lot of workers at mini-
mum wage, increased unemployment may result as the demand for la-
bor declines but the wage is held fixed. The unemployment rate within
the industry is also likely to rise for the period of time that unemploy-
ment benefits are available to displaced workers. Rising unemployment
for these reasons, or the employment of displaced workers in lower
paying positions in other industries, again reflects a loss of rents by
marginal workers not entirely captured by the analysis of the competi-
tive model.
Over time, however, unemployment is likely to decline. Unions
eventually tend to accept wage concessions to limit the number of lay-
offs. Union and nonunion workers alike generally become more willing
to accept wage concessions after their unemployment benefits are ex-
hausted. Even minimum wages may decline in real terms when unem-
ployment among low-skilled workers is extensive-the nominal
minimum wage is then more likely to remain fixed so that the real mini-
mum wage declines with overall price inflation. These developments
126. For example, one might allow a larger vertical distance between the curves Sd
and OC, thus increasing the area ik. Such a diagram would depict a greater magnitude
of rents to marginal workers.
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may not eliminate rents to marginal workers altogether, but will often
reduce them considerably as the labor market gradually adjusts to the
fall in the demand for labor.
These observations suggest that the loss of producer surplus at-
tendant upon an increase in import competition is likely to be greatest
during the initial period of increased competition. Over time, real
wages in the affected industry will often adjust to allow some displaced
workers to return to work; rents at the margin will decline accordingly
and the loss of worker rents will be ameliorated. Indeed, import com-
petition may put downward pressure on any rents earned by marginal
workers, with attendant benefits to the economy once a downward ad-
justment of the rents has occurred. For example, increased import
competition may eventually induce unions to forego monopoly rents
and eliminate distortions otherwise created by unionization.
2. Implications for Countervailing Duty Policy.-At first blush, the anal-
ysis above offers a plausible rationale for countervailing duties: in
some cases, they may represent a second-best response to the adjust-
ment costs that result from the entry of subsidized competition into
markets in which marginal workers earn rents. 127 Interestingly, the
analysis also provides a justification for an "injury test," which would
focus on the extent to which subsidized competition may impose ad-
justment costs on domestic producers that exceed the benefits of the
subsidies to domestic consumers, and the extent to which counter-
vailing duties might generate an increment in producer surplus and
government revenue that outweighs the associated loss of consumer
surplus.
But a number of objections arise. If the first-best policy (say, a
wage subsidy) is infeasible, an appropriate second-best policy may also
be infeasible. For example, if the wage subsidy is infeasible because
information problems prevent accurate calculation of the appropriate
wage subsidy market-by-market, those same information problems will
likely make it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether a counter-
vailing duty will enhance economic welfare.
Moreover, existing law does not track this second-best rationale for
countervailing duties very closely. The injury test under existing law is
not applied in all countervailing duty investigations.1 28 When the in-
jury test does apply, it requires no balancing of producer and consumer
interests and entails no effort to assess whether adjustment costs are
large enough that duties might enhance national economic welfare.
Furthermore, an affirmative finding of injury under the existing injury
test does not require the presence of factors that would suggest that
127. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 120 (suggesting possible use of countervailing
duties to counter "acute adjustment costs"); Lawrence, Comment on a Paper by Krug-
man, 1984 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity 125, 127 (suggesting use of countervailing
duties to protect against the effects of foreign subsidies upon domestic unemployment).
128. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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marginal workers are earning rents-factors such as substantial unem-
ployment, extensive unionization,1 29 or a large number of workers em-
ployed at minimum wage. Thus, if countervailing duties are to be
justified on efficiency grounds as a response to the adjustment costs
that result from subsidized import competition, considerable modifica-
tion to existing law is warranted.
Further reflection suggests, however, that even an appropriately
modified countervailing duty law would be, at best, superfluous. As
with other possible efficiency justifications for countervailing duties,
any welfare gain from a duty in a market where marginal workers earn
rents has little to do with the subsidization of imports. Rather, when-
ever imports are present in such a market, a duty or tariff on imports
conceivably enhances national economic welfare. Concomitantly, sub-
sequent to any increase in import competition, an increase in the level
of protection conceivably enhances welfare. The benefits of a duty, if
any, arise whether the import competition or the increase in import
competition results from subsidization, changing technology, rising ed-
ucational levels abroad or other changes in the nature of factor endow-
ments, fluctuations in the exchange rate, or some other development.
It makes little sense, therefore, to condition the policy reponse to
increased import competition upon the existence or nonexistence of
subsidization. If the public policy concern is with the magnitude of att-
tendant adjustment costs, the focus should be solely upon the conse-
quences of the increased import competition, whatever its cause. The
"escape clause" under U.S. law' 30 has precisely such a focus. Under
the escape clause, U.S. industries that suffer "serious injury" as a result
of increased imports may petition for a period of temporary relief. If
the ITC determines that the statutory requirements for relief are satis-
fied-increased imports, serious injury, and a causal relation between
the increased imports and the injury-the President may grant relief
after due consideration of a number of factors, including the effect of
import relief upon consumers. 13 ' Relief may take a variety of forms,
including "adjustment assistance" to displaced workers (assistance for
retraining, relocation, supplemental unemployment benefits, and the
like) or temporary tariffs or quotas.
Without question, this approach to the amelioration of adjustment
costs has considerable advantages over countervailing duty laws. First,
the escape clause applies to all imports, so that the cause of increased
import competition is properly deemed irrelevant.' 3 2 Second, any re-
strictions on imports are temporary (limited to eight years), so that the
129. Of course, the proposition that union wages ought to be protected from ero-
sion is subject to the objection that union wages are artificially inflated from the outset
and ought to be allowed to decline.
130. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2254 (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
131. Id. § 2253(a)(2)(F)(ii).
132. See id. § 2252(b)(1).
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process of adjustment to new competitive conditions is not perma-
nently retarded, and protection is roughly limited to the period in
which any inefficient reduction of employment in the affected industry
is likely to be the greatest. Third, the requirement of "serious injury"
tends (albeit imperfectly) to limit affirmative injury determinations to
industries that show evidence of serious unemployment' 8 8-an impor-
tant indicator that adjustment costs may be large enough to justify pro-
tection. Fourth, the extent of any protection for the industry is
determined with reference to the consequences of protection, and is
not mechanistically constrained to equal the size of the "subsidy." Fi-
nally, the requirement that the President consider the interests of con-
sumers before granting any relief'34 permits a balancing of the costs
and benefits of protection.
In short, although the existing escape clause assuredly falls short
of an ideal response to the problem of adjustment costs, it seems a far
better response than the existing countervailing duty laws.'1 5 Likewise,
efforts to amend the countervailing duty laws so that they might deal
more appropriately with adjustment costs would confront the problem
that these laws by their nature address "subsidized" competition, yet
the existence or nonexistence of subsidization should be irrelevant to
the formulation of a response to the problem of adjustment costs.
This proposition perhaps requires one caveat. As noted earlier,
the adjustment costs attributable to an increase in import competition
are likely to be most severe immediately following a change in competi-
tive conditions. Hence, if subsidized competition is systematically tran-
sitory-that is, if subsidies are frequently temporary-it might be
argued that subsidized competition at times warrants a greater measure
of protection than other types of import competition. In particular, it
might be argued that while protection against most forms of import
133. See Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2125 (July 1985); Heavyweight Motorcycles, and Engines and
Power Train Subassemblies Therefor, USITC Pub. 1342, Inv. No. TA-201-47, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2469 (Feb. 1983) (Report to the President); 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 2252(c)(1)(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
134. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2253(a)(2)(F)(ii) (West 1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
135. It might be argued that a disadvantage of using the escape clause to address
the problem of adjustment costs is the GATT requirement of "compensation," which
does not apply to the use of countervailing duties. Under article XIX of the GAIT, a
signatory cannot impose trade restrictions under the escape clause without compensat-
ing adversely affected members of GATT if the restrictions impair the value to them of a
prior GAIT concession (typically a tariff concession under article II). GAIT, supra
note 13, art. XIX. In practice, such compensation usually takes the form of a reduction
in tariffs or nontariff barriers on products outside the scope of the escape clause action.
It is incorrect to view this compensation requirement as a disadvantage of the es-
cape clause. To the contrary, if the trade concession that serves as compensation is
chosen wisely, the United States can provide protection to an industry suffering from
serious adjustment costs while removing protection from an industry that does not re-
quire protection to avert such costs. The U.S. economy may then reap a double benefit.
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competition should facilitate long-term adjustment to the change in
competitive conditions, a long-term adjustment to subsidized competi-
tion is unnecessary because of its transitoriness, and a short-term ad-
justment may be undesirable because of the attendant adjustment
costs. 136
Whatever the merits of this argument in theory, it lacks empirical
support. A review of prior countervailing duty cases reveals little evi-
dence of subsidy programs that are explicitly transitory in character,
such as programs that provide benefits only during cyclical business
downturns.' 3 7 Futhermore, there is no reason to suppose that subsidy
programs in general will be short-lived. To the contrary, as anyone fa-
miliar with farm subsidies in the United States, Europe, Japan, or else-
where will attest, government subsidy programs often last for decades
and are notoriously difficult to curtail or discontinue.' 3 8 Thus,
although the evidence is limited, it does not support the proposition
that "subsidized" import competition is particularly transitory. Other
sources of increased import competition, such as exchange rate fluctua-
tions, may be far more transitory.
Finally, even if it could be shown that subsidies are more transitory
than other sources of increased import competition, that fact would by
no means establish the need for anything resembling the existing coun-
tervailing duty laws. At most, it might justify some attention in escape
clause proceedings to the question whether the change in competitive
conditions in the industry under investigation may, for whatever rea-
son, be temporary. That question should in any event receive careful
consideration in the selection of escape clause remedies since it bears
upon the long-term viability of domestic producers and thus upon the
question whether any temporary protection should be designed to pre-
serve the domestic industry-and the rents that it earns-from erosion
by increased import competition, or instead merely to ameliorate ad-
justment costs by facilitating a more orderly contraction.
B. Distributional Considerations
Just as protection is only a second-best response to the inefficien-
cies that arise when inputs earn rents at the margin, protection may be
an inefficient way to promote greater equity in income distribution.
The received wisdom is that other methods of redistribution are more
136. Jacob Viner's concern about dumping by foreign companies arose largely be-
cause of his assumption that dumping is transitory. SeeJ. Viner, Dumping: A Problem
in International Trade 139-40 (1923).
137. Most of the programs that provide benefits only during business "downturns"
are found in the agricultural sector, such as price support programs, deficiency payment
schemes, and the like. See, e.g., Rice from Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,356 (1986); Lamb
Meat from N.Z., 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708 (1985).
138. See generally Pickard, Price and Income Adjustment Programs, in Agricultural
Law 2-20 (J. Davidson ed. 1981) (discussing history of farm subsidies in the United
States).
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effective and less costly.13 9 Assuming arguendo that protection is at least
occasionally a sensible policy instrument for redistribution, however,
countervailing duties are at best an inferior protectionist option. The
argument against the use of countervailing duties for this purpose fol-
lows immediately from the superiority of the escape clause as a means
to ameliorate the problem of adjustment costs.
Recall that the case for special assistance to workers who are dis-
placed by import competition rests on the premise that adjustment to
import competition is more difficult than adjustment to other causes of
economic disclocation. Increased domestic competition, for example,
causes some domestic firms to contract while others in the same indus-
try expand. The total number of jobs in the industry can remain the
same or even increase. Likewise, business cycles generally do not cause
a permanent reduction in the number ofjobs in affected industries; dis-
placed workers can often return to work. Increased import competi-
tion, by contrast, may cause a permanent contraction in the affected
domestic industry. Hence, the argument runs, adjustment to import
competition is more difficult for workers displaced by import competi-
tion because they often must retrain for positions in other industries or
accept unskilled positions at drastically reduced wages. 140
Again, however, the burden of adjustment to import competition
in no way depends upon the presence or absence of subsidization.
Whether the increase in import competition results from subsidies,
from shifting comparative advantage and economic development
abroad, or from other factors, the burden on the displaced worker is
much the same. It makes little sense to condition the use of protection-
ist measures upon the reason for the increase in import competition,
rather than simply on its consequences.
Hence, the escape clause again dominates any type of counter-
vailing duty policy as a means to lessen the burden of import competi-
tion upon displaced workers. The protection that it offers is temporary
and readily limited to the period in which special assistance is war-
ranted. Its "serious injury" test searches for evidence of severe eco-
nomic dislocation that might justify a program of special assistance.
The magnitude of any protection is tailored to the circumstances at
hand. Finally, the escape clause properly deems irrelevant the cause of
the increase in import competition. Thus, even assuming for the sake
of argument that protective measures are at times desirable as a way to
redistribute income, countervailing duties are comparatively ill-suited
to that purpose.
139. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
140. If increased import competition is transitory, then displaced workers need not
confront the choice between retraining for another industry or accepting unskilled em-
ployment. The case for special assistance to such workers is accordingly weaker than the
case for special assistance to workers displaced by a permanent change in competitive
conditions.
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V. DEPARTURES FROM PERFECT COMPETITION IN THE PRODUCT MARKET
In theory, foreign governments may use subsidies to help their in-
dustries to earn supracompetitive returns at the expense of U.S. indus-
tries and consumers. This possibility is sometimes advanced as a
justification for countervailing duties.' 4 ' In its simplest form, the anal-
ysis supposes that foreign governments may provide the financing for
predatory campaigns to monopolize U.S. or world markets. Even if the
threat of such predation is sufficiently real that some sort of counter-
vailing duty remedy might be desirable, however, existing U.S. counter-
vailing duty law is grossly overbroad as a remedy for predation.
Alternatively, the analysis suggests that a foreign government may
use subsidies to enhance the strategic position of its producers, thereby
enabling the subsidizing country to earn supracompetitive returns, to
capture additional scale economies, or to reap certain positive external-
ities at the expense of its overseas competitors. Although the imposi-
tion of a countervailing duty under such circumstances might in theory
enhance national economic welfare, the identification of those circum-
stances would be virtually impossible because of insurmountable infor-
mation requirements. And, once again, existing law does not begin to
take account of the factors that might justify the imposition of a duty.
A. Predation
Few topics in antitrust law have generated more academic atten-
tion over the past thirty years than predation and, in particular, preda-
tory pricing. 142 A predatory price is usually defined as a price that
entails a sacrifice of profit in the short run for the purpose of driving
competitors from the market, with the anticipation that the exit of those
competitors will enable the predator firms to raise prices and earn mo-
nopoly or "supracompetitive" profits thereafter.' 43
The argument that predatory pricing might justify the imposition
of countervailing dudes runs as follows: A foreign government pro-
vides a subsidy to its producers that enables them to sell their output
profitably at a price that is unprofitable to U.S. producers. As a result,
U.S. producers are driven out of business, and the foreign producers
gain a dominant position in the U.S. market. At that point, the foreign
producers raise their prices above the competitive level, and U.S. con-
sumers must pay a monopoly price that they would not have had to pay
if domestic competition had survived. To avoid this outcome, the argu-
ment runs, the United States should impose countervailing duties on
141. See, e.g., Barcelo, supra note 12, at 797; see also sources cited infra notes 144,
182 & 193.
142. A useful collection of materials on predatory pricing may be found in R.
Posner & F. Easterbrook, Antitrust 680-714 (2d ed. 1981).
143. See, e.g., Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 Yale L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979); Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 Yale L.J. 8, 9 (1981).
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the subsidized imports to eliminate their competitive advantage and
save U.S. competition from extinction.144
This argument has some merit in the abstract-foreign govern-
ment-financed predation, if it exists, can indeed impose a welfare loss
upon the U.S. economy. In fact, the domestic welfare loss from foreign
predation may be greater than the loss from predation by domestic
firms. To see why, assume that static, partial equilibrium analysis cap-
tures the essential welfare consequences of predation, 145 and that in
the absence of predation, the market would at all times be perfectly
competitive and in long run equilibrium. Suppose first that a domestic
firm conducts a predatory campaign in which it plans to drive other
domestic firms out of business by setting a price below all firms' varia-
ble costs. A welfare loss then occurs because consumer willingness-to-
pay, at the margin, is below that cost. If the campaign is successful and
the predator subsequently raises price above the competitive level-
long-run marginal cost-another welfare loss occurs because consumer
willingness-to-pay exceeds long run marginal cost.1 4 6 The loss of con-
sumer surplus due to the supracompetitive price is partially offset, how-
ever, by an increase in producer surplus, in the form of monopoly
profits, to the successful predator.
Now suppose that the same predatory campaign is conducted by a
foreign firm. We may assume that the campaign is financed by a for-
eign government subsidy, but the source of the financing is unimpor-
tant to this analysis. If U.S. competitors do not match the below-cost
price during the predatory campaign, no productive inefficiency arises
domestically, and the predatory campaign is a net gain to the U.S. econ-
omy in the form of an increase in consumer surplus that exceeds the
loss of producer surplus. 147 If the predatory campaign suceeds, how-
ever, and prices rise above the competitive level, the loss of domestic
consumer surplus will not be partially offset by an increase in domestic
producer surplus' 48-foreign companies will capture monopoly profits.
144. See G. Bryan, supra note 12, at 277; Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12, at 835;
see also Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note 11, at 332 (suggesting that subsidized im-
ports conceivably create foreign-dominated monopolies by driving out domestic produ-
cers even in the absence of anticompetitive intent); cf. W. Corden, supra note 67, at
246-47 (discussing "predatory dumping").
145. Joskow & Klevorick, for example, focus in part on the relation between pric-
ing, market structure and the rate of technological progress. Joskow & Klevorick, supra
note 143, at 231-34.
146. Whether a price above variable cost but below long-run marginal cost should
be viewed as creating a welfare loss depends upon the assumption about the need to
replace existing fixed investments, an issue that need not be addressed for purposes of
this illustration.
147. This proposition is analogous, although imperfectly, to the effect of the sub-
sidy in Figure I above, and assumes away any additional loss of domestic producer rents
due to the failure of input markets to clear at competitive prices. See supra notes 76-87
and accompanying text.
148. This assumes that domestic firms have failed.
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In sum, from the U.S. perspective, foreign government-financed
predation may entail less welfare loss than domestic predation during
the predatory campaign (perhaps even a gain), but it potentially entails
a far greater welfare loss in the longer term if the predatory campaign
succeeds. Some policy response to foreign government-financed pre-
dation may well be warranted, therefore, and countervailing duties are
certainly one option.
But the antitrust laws ordinarily provide a remedy for predatory
pricing. Perhaps implicit in any argument that countervailing duties
are needed as a remedy for foreign government-financed predation,
therefore, is an assumption that the antitrust laws cannot or should not
be employed to deal with such predation. This assumption is arguably
correct. Under existing law, the "act of state" doctrine provides that
U.S. courts will not scrutinize the legality of statutes, decrees, orders,
and resolutions by a foreign government.1 49 This doctrine would al-
most certainly lead to the dismissal of any antitrust action against a for-
eign government that alleged that the government was engaged in
predation through one of its subsidy programs.' 50 It would also in all
likelihood lead to the dismissal of an action solely against the benefi-
ciaries of the subsidy program if such an action would necessitate an
inquiry into the legality of the program. 151
Absent any challenge to the legality of the subsidy program itself,
an antitrust violation might be impossible to establish. Although bene-
ficiaries of the subsidy program might be shown to have reduced their
prices in response to the subsidy, a foreign company does not violate
the antitrust laws merely by reducing prices in response to government
assistance, even if the effect is to drive U.S. competitors from the mar-
ket and provide the foreign company with a dominant position. 152
149. E.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 686
(1976).
150. Dismissal might also be required by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.),
unless the subsidy program could be characterized as a "commercial activity" within the
commercial activity exception to the provisions of that Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
151. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), the
plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants invoked the Honduran judicial process to
help them in maintaining their monopoly over lumber exports from Honduras. The
Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court, held that the act of state doctrine did not
require dismissal of the claim, in part because the plaintiff "does not seek to name
Honduras or any Honduran officer as a defendant or co-conspirator, nor does it chal-
lenge Honduran policy or sovereignty in any fashion that appears on its face to hold any
threat to relations between Honduras and the United States." Id. at 608. By contrast, a
suit predicated on the theory that a foreign government subsidy program amounts to
government financing for a predatory scheme would raise far more serious questions
about the actions of foreign government officials and raise potentially difficult foreign
relations issues.
152. Even if foreign producers actually acquire a monopoly position, the mere
existence of monopoly power does not establish a violation of the antitrust laws. See,
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Every subsidy has the effect of reducing certain costs of production,
and the natural, competitive response to a reduction in costs is usually a
reduction in prices. Although such a price reduction would surely dis-
advantage competitors, it would not by itself evidence predatory intent,
nor would it seem to violate any of the cost-based tests for predatory
pricing embraced by the courts in recent years: 153 a subsidy that
reduces costs from the perspective of the beneficiary of the subsidy
should reduce commensurately any cost-based benchmark for the de-
tection of a predatory price.' 5 4
Would efforts by the subsidized firms to raise prices after the pred-
atory campaign violate the antitrust laws? Perhaps, but not necessarily.
A single predator firm can generally institute price increases without
violating the law. 155 If the predatory campaign involves multiple firms,
an agreement to raise prices would violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' 56 But as an industry becomes more concentrated due to the elim-
ination of competition, prices may well rise without any agreement to
increase them simply because of the change in strategic conditions. a57
Moreover, even if a section 1 violation could be shown, the efficacy of
an ex post damages remedy against foreign firms may at times be poor
e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 29-30
(1977).
153. The Areeda-Turner test condemns as predatory any price below average vari-
able cost, a proxy for marginal cost. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Re-
lated Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 712-18
(1975). This test has been applied by a number of courts. See, e.g., Arthur S.
Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E.Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Americana Indus., Inc. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 556 F.2d 625,
627-28 (1st Cir. 1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714, 723-24 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). Prices above average
variable cost but below average total cost may also evidence predation upon a showing
of predatory intent. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); see also
Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795-97 (10th Cir.) (pric-
ing below average total cost not predatory when firms possess excess capacity), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 143, at 252-54 (recom-
mending that a price above average variable cost but below average total cost be pre-
sumed predatory unless defendant shows that this price maximizes short-run profits).
Thus, average total cost may also be used as a benchmark for the detection of potentially
predatory prices. All of these benchmarks, however, rely upon the private costs of pro-
duction to the antitrust defendant, which are reduced by the presence of government
subsidies.
154. Thus, for example, assume that the Areeda-Turner test will be used to deter-
mine whether the price of imports is predatory. If a firm with constant variable costs of
$100 per unit receives a $50 per unit subsidy, its private variable costs per unit decline
to $50. Any price above $50, therefore, will presumably avoid condemnation under the
Areeda-Turner test.
155. See supra note 152.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
157. See, e.g., Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry and
Mergers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1857, 1867-72 (1982).
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since enforcement of any judgment may be quite difficult.158
In short, if a subsidy program facilitated price reductions by for-
eign producers that enabled them to obtain monopoly power in the
U.S. market, the existing antitrust laws might not provide an effective
remedy. A possible solution, of course, is to amend the antitrust laws
to encompass foreign government-financed predation more clearly.
But if the policy considerations that underlie the act of state doctrine-
international comity and deference to the Executive Branch in matters
affecting foreign relations 159 -are to be accorded much weight, federal
court litigation over the question whether foreign subsidies facilitate
"predation" might seem undesirable. Unlike the antitrust laws, how-
ever, countervailing duties are sanctioned by international agreement
under the GATT, and they are assessed and administered by the De-
partment of Commerce, an arm of the Executive Branch. Similarly, the
difficulties of enforcing antitrust remedies against foreign firms may
weigh in favor of a more prophylactic approach.
Thus, a plausible argument might be made that countervailing du-
ties are superior to an antitrust remedy, but it remains to inquire
whether any remedy at all is really necessary-whether the threat of
monopolization by subsidized foreign producers is a serious one. A
number of writers have suggested that predation is extremely uncom-
mon, if not nonexistent, in the private sector. Predatory campaigns are
costly for the predator, and recoupment of losses even if the campaign
is successful may be impossible. For this reason, it is argued, rational
entrepreneurs will rarely, if ever, find predation worthwhile.160 Other
writers suggest that predation is at times a rational business strategy, as
perhaps when the predator has a lower cost of capital than rivals, but
nonetheless conclude that it is fairly uncommon.161 Even if predation
is sometimes rational and occasionally arises, however, the error costs
of legal rules against predation may be prohibitive: more often than
not, such rules may result in the condemnation of desirable competitive
behavior.' 6 2
These writers focus upon privately financed predation by domestic
firms. In the abstract, however, foreign government-financed preda-
158. In addition, the costs of administering a complex antitrust suit can be quite
substantial.
159. See generally L. Schwartz, J. Flynn & H. First, Free Enterprise and Economic
Organization: Antitrust 863-70 (6th ed. 1983).
160. See R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 144-60 (1978); Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 267-70 (1981); McGee, Preda-
tory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958). The
Supreme Court was heavily influenced by this body of work in Matsushita Elec. Indus. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-93 (1986).
161. See Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev.
506, 515-23 (1974); Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9J.L. & Econ.
259 (1966).
162. See Easterbrook, supra note 160, at 318-33.
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tion might seem somewhat more likely than privately financed preda-
tion. Governments may care little about the overall profitability of
predation and the prospects of recouping losses incurred during a
predatory campaign. Governments often subsidize the private sector,
and they may be willing to "subsidize" otherwise unprofitable preda-
tion. 163 In addition, some foreign government subsidy practices may
unwittingly lead to predatory outcomes, irrespective of the government
objective behind the subsidy program. Finally, foreign governments
may enjoy a lower cost of capital than private firms and, as noted, pre-
dation is more likely to be profitable when the predator enjoys a lower
cost of capital.
Theory aside, however, there is little empirical evidence to suggest
that foreign government-financed predation occurs to any significant
extent.' 64 To be sure, countervailing duty cases sometimes involve
U.S. "industries" that appear to be highly concentrated, taking the
ITC's definition of "industry" to be the relevant market for antitrust
analysis and ignoring alternative sources of imports. 16 5 But whether
the other structural conditions necessary for successful predation 166
are present in these cases is a matter of conjecture.
Given the absence of clear evidence that foreign government-fi-
nanced predation poses a sigiificant threat to the competitiveness of
U.S. markets, an argument can be made that countervailing duty laws
are an undesirable way to deal with the perceived threat of predation.
Laws that deal with nonexistent problems are not merely superfluous,
163. Of course, if government-financed predation by foreign producers is ulti-
mately unprofitable from the perspective of the foreign country (its government and
producers taken as a whole), even a successful predatory campaign is less likely to re-
duce U.S. economic welfare: short-run gains to U.S. consumers are more likely to out-
weigh long-run losses.
164. In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978), the
plaintiff alleged that a Polish-owned manufacturer was monopolizing the U.S. market for
golf carts. The court held, inter alia, that without proof that the foreign firm set price
below some measure of cost, the foreign firm would not be liable for predatory pricing
for offering lower prices as a result of a subsidy by the foreign government. Id. at 400.
Interestingly, the countervailing duty laws do not apply to imports from nonmarket
economies such as Poland. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d
1308, 1313-18 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examina-
tion of the Application of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United
States to China and other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1987)
(discussing application of antidumping laws to nonmarket economies).
165. See Agricultural Tillage Tools from Braz., USITC Pub. 1761, Inv. No. 701-
TA-233, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1028, 1030 (Oct. 1985) (ITC determination)
(only two producers in U.S. "disc" industry); Nitrocellulose from Fr., USITO Pub. 1390,
Inv. No. 701-TA-190, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1565, 1566 (June 1983) (ITC de-
termination) (only one producer in U.S. industry); Potassium Permanganate from the
People's Republic of China and Spain, USITC Pub. 1369, Inv. No. 731-TA-125 (Apr.
1983) (preliminary determination) (only one producer in U.S. industry); Potassium Per-
manganate from Spain, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,300 (1982) (ITA determination).
166. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
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but invite abuse and error. On the other hand, perhaps the absence of
clear evidence of the problem merely suggests that the countervailing
duty laws have deterred foreign government-financed predation in the
past, and that they remain necessary to deter foreign government-fi-
nanced predation in the future, especially absent any change in the an-
titrust laws directed at the problem.
Whatever position one takes on the need for a remedy for foreign
government-financed predation, however, the existing countervailing
duty laws cannot possibly be justified as a reasonable means to combat
it. Presently, countervailing duties are routinely imposed under condi-
tions in which there is no danger of monopolization. The recent duties
on many steel products, and on a variety of farm, forest and fishery
products, are illustrative. The market share of the producers subject to
the duties is typically small, and conditions of entry and exit in the af-
fected markets, both at home and abroad, are such that the attempted
exercise of market power by any producer would be thwarted by new
entry or reentry. 16 7 Hence, unless existing law can be justified on some
other basis-a highly disputable proposition-the analysis above sug-
gests at a minimum that the law requires substantial modification to
ensure that countervailing duties will not be imposed absent evidence
that foreign government-financed predation poses a serious threat of
monopolization in the industry under investigation.
Unfortunately, a definitive test for the existence of predation, with
or without the complicating factor of government subsidization, is diffi-
cult to fashion. A number of tests for predation in the private sector
have been proposed, some based upon a comparison of prices with
costs, some based upon changes in output or prices, others incorporat-
ing a structural analysis designed to identify markets in which success-
ful predation is a realistic danger, and still others that search for
evidence of predatory intent. 168 This is assuredly not the place to re-
solve the debate over which of these approaches, if any, is superior.
But taken as a whole, the academic literature on predation suggests sev-
eral principles that might be used to limit the use of countervailing du-
ties to cases in which monopolization is a genuine concern.
As noted, when the beneficiary of a subsidy reduces prices in re-
sponse to the subsidy, no inference can ordinarily be drawn about the
167. In Live Swine and Pork from Can., USITO Pub. 1733, Inv. No. 701-TA-224, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2285 (July 1985), for example, countervailing duties were
eventually imposed on imports of live hogs. Canadian producers collectively had less
than five percent of the U.S. market and faced competition from over 10,000 domestic
hog farmers.
Similarly, in Certain Carbon Steel Prods. from Korea, USITC Pub. 1346, Inv. No.
701-TA-170, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 2393 (Feb. 1983), countervailing duties
were eventually imposed on certain steel imports from Korea, which had a market share
of less than one-half of one percent. Korea faced competition not only from many do-
mestic steel firms in the market, but also from innumerable other foreign suppliers.
168. See sources cited supra notes 143, 153, 159 & 160.
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existence of a predatory objective from the price level alone. In most
instances, such price reductions will represent nothing more than a
competitive response to the institution of a subsidy program under
conditions in which the acquisition of monopoly power is neither in-
tended nor likely, and indeed, in which monopolization is often incon-
ceivable. Hence, a structural analysis of the industry in question would
be a useful first step to weed out cases in which the characteristics of
the industry make the acquisition and exploitation of a market power by
the alleged predators infeasible.
Similar recommendations have been advanced with respect to the
analysis of predation under the antitrust laws.' 6 9 Although the details
of these recommendations vary somewhat, general agreement exists
that the structural analysis should focus on at least three factors: con-
centration, conditions of entry, and conditions of reentry.' 70 In partic-
ular, a price above the competitive level is most unlikely to arise unless,
after the exit of competitors, the market exhibits a high degree of con-
centration and the predator firms' 71 control a large share of the mar-
ket. 172 And even if concentration is high, the predator firms may be
unable to raise prices significantly after the exit of competitors without
attracting entry by new firms or reentry by former competitors which
will drive prices back down to the competitive level. Thus, both "entry
hurdles"' 73 and "reentry barriers"' 174 must be considerable.
169. See, e.g., Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 143, at 219-22; Ordover & Willig,
supra note 143, at 10; Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Predatory Systems Rivalry: A Reply, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1150 (1983).
170. SeeJoskow & Klevorick, supra note 143, at 224; Ordover & Willig, supra note
143, at 10-12.
171. The likelihood of a supracompetitive price is reduced as the number of foreign
firms that survive after the predatory campaign increases, because they must then coor-
dinate pricing among themselves to avoid competing away the benefits of their collective
market power.
172. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 143, at 225-27; Ordover & Willig, supra note
143, at 11.
173. Entry "hurdles" exist if prospective entrants to a market are cost-disadvan-
taged relative to established firms merely because the'latter group of firms already func-
tion as a going concern. They arise when the fixed investments of the potential entrant
are wholly or partially irreversible, as when, for example, the cost of the investments
cannot be fully recovered if the entrant later decides to exit. Under these conditions,
potential entry does not constrain the pricing behavior of existing firms as much as ac-
tual entry: existing firms enjoy a strategic advantage because their fixed costs are al-
ready sunk. They can then make credible threats to reduce prices below the level that
allows a potential entrant to enter profitably-the level that allows at least a competitive
rate of return on the entrant's fixed investments. Existing firms can thereby deter entry,
yet sustain prices above the competitive level, up to a point, over time. See W. Baumol,
J. Panzar & R. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure
279-309 (1982); C. von Weizsacker, Barriers to Entry 125-44 (1980); Baumol & Willig,
Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and the Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 QJ.
Econ. 405, 416-19 (1981); Ordover & Willig, supra note 143, at 11-12.
174. Reentry barriers exist when a firm that has exited the industry cannot reenter
without incurring added costs for that purpose. If a firm that shuts down during a pred-
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Markets that exhibit a degree of concentration, entry hurdles, and
reentry barriers sufficient to make successful predation realistically pos-
sible may be quite rare.1 75 Indeed, as noted, some writers have argued
that such markets may not exist at all.' 76 A structural analysis of the
sort suggested here, and elaborated at length by the commentators
cited above, would thus preclude the imposition of countervailing du-
ties in the vast majority of cases in which they have been imposed in the
past.
In industries in which a structural analysis suggests that successful
predation is possible, however, it does not follow that countervailing
duties should be imposed automatically. Rather, domestic producers
should also be required to demonstrate that their survival as competi-
tors is jeopardized by the pricing of the subsidized imports-that the
alleged predation has had or will have the effect of driving rivals from
the market, leaving the predator firms with considerably increased mar-
ket power. Absent evidence that competitive rivalry has diminished or
will diminish significantly as a result of the subsidization, no threat to
the competitiveness of market pricing would exist. A showing that the
survival of domestic competitors is threatened by subsidization is some-
what analogous to the injury test under existing law, but would require
a showing of considerably more injury to domestic firms than mere
"material injury," which suffices for the imposition of duties pres-
ently.177 It would also require a showing that the threat to viability
arises by reason of the subsidy and that the imposition of a duty to
offset the subsidy would cause prices to rise by enough to protect the
viability of existing competition.17 8 As noted previously, such a "causal
atory campaign can costlessly resume production when the predator attempts to raise
prices, then predation would be pointless. Ordover & Willig, supra note 143, at 12. But
if a firm that shuts down must incur additional, irreversible costs to reassemble or restart
its physical and human capital, the predator will again have some ability to sustain a
price above the competitive level. In the extreme, if reentry entails the same irreversible
costs as new entry, then "reentry barriers" are identical to the "entry hurdles" discussed
supra note 173.
175. To conduct a structural analysis of concentration, entry hurdles, and reentry
barriers, it is necessary to define the "relevant market" for the measurement and assess-
ment of these factors, much as in conventional antitrust analysis under the "rule of rea-
son." See, e.g., R. Posner & F. Easterbrook, supra note 142, at 347-85. That exercise is
closely akin to the definition of "industry" for purposes of injury analysis under the
existing countervailing duty laws, which also looks to factors such as the cross-elasticity
of demand and supply. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Braz., Korea and Spain,
USITC Pub. 1633, Inv. No. 701-TA-215, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1669, 1671
(Jan. 1985) (attention to cross-elasticity of demand); Tool Steels from Braz. and W.
Ger., USITG Pub. 1403, Inv. No. 701-TA-187, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. Dec. (BNA) 1642,
1645 (July 1983) (attention to cross-elasticity of supply); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(4) (West
1980 & Supp. 4 Dec. 1988).
176. E.g., R. Bork, supra note 160, at 149-54.
177. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
178. A demonstration that the threat to the viability of domestic competitors arises
because of subsidized competition within the U.S. market, rather than subsidized com-
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link" between the injury to domestic firms and the subsidy at issue is
not required by existing law. 179
In sum, a countervailing duty law properly tailored to address the
problem of foreign government-financed predation would differ from
existing law in a number of key respects. It would incorporate a struc-
tural analysis, akin to elements of the traditional rule of reason analysis
in antitrust law, to determine whether a serious threat of monopoliza-
tion can exist within the industry in question. It would also inquire
whether the subsidies in question result in prices that pose a genuine
threat to the viability of domestic competition and whether the impOSi-
tion of duties on U.S. imports would suffice to alleviate the threat to
competition. °80 Whether these prerequisites for countervailing duties
should be sufficient for the imposition of duties to combat predation, or
should simply be necessary, is left for future consideration.
Indeed, if one supposes that the, error costs of any test for foreign
government-financed predation may be considerable and that such pre-
dation is of little empirical importance, then any remedy to deal with it
may be undesirable. The remarks above are offered not so much to
suggest a definitive policy toward foreign government-financed preda-
tion, but rather to show that existing law is wildly inconsistent with an
approach to the imposition of countervailing duties that would limit
their use to cases in which foreign monopolization of domestic markets
might be a legitimate concern.
B. Strategic Trade Policy
The burgeoning literature on "strategic trade policy" suggests new
justifications for intervention in trade, including possible justifications
for tariffs that resemble countervailing duties.' 8 1 Although these argu-
ments for countervailing duties are related to the analysis of predation
developed above, they do not depend on the proposition that foreign
subsidies will extinguish domestic competition through predatory price
cutting. They are, however, ultimately unconvincing. The extraordi-
petition in U.S. export markets, should also be required. Otherwise, the imposition of
duties on U.S. imports will not alleviate the threat to competition.
179. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
180. The distinction between export subsidies and domestic subsidies that exists
under current law is also unnecessary to a legal regime concerned principally with for-
eign government-financed predation. In particular, the mere existence of an export sub-
sidy warrants no inference of predation-a structural analysis and analysis of the threat
to viability is still necessary to determine whether predation might be present. Concom-
itantly, although foreign governments may under some conditions find export subsidies
the cheapest way to finance predation (it is perhaps easier for them to eliminate foreign
competition in the home market through tariffs and other protective measures rather
than through predatory domestic subsidies), domestic subsidies may deliberately or un-
wittingly lead to predatory outcomes. At most, therefore, export subsidies may arouse
slightly greater suspicion of predation, but do not warrant special treatment.
181. See sources cited infra notes 182, 185, 189 & 191-93.
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nary amount of information required to determine whether the imposi-
tion of a countervailing duty would be a sensible component of
strategic trade policy makes it highly unlikely that countervailing duties
could ever be usefully applied for that purpose. Furthermore, existing
U.S. countervailing duty law does not even direct inquiry at the factors
that would be determinative of whether the imposition of a duty might
be beneficial.18 2
Consider first an imperfectly competitive industry in which all pro-
ducers are located abroad. Hence, under free trade, all monopoly rents
are captured by foreign firms. 183 Assume further that the foreign pro-
ducers receive subsidies of one sort or another from their governments.
The imposition of a "countervailing duty" on imports under these con-
ditions may enhance national economic welfare because duties serve as
a means of "rent extraction." Foreign producers will ordinarily re-
spond to a duty by reducing their prices,184 and hence the duty revenue
may more than offset the loss of domestic consumer surplus:185 part of
the revenue comes out of the monopoly rents of the foreign producers.
Intuitively, this result is closely analogous to the earlier result regard-
ing countervailing duties under conditions of perfect competition with
182. For simplicity of exposition, the discussion to follow is limited for the most
part to industries in which producers earn supracompetitive returns ("monopoly rents")
or in which producers could earn such rents with the appropriate government policy in
place. See generally W. Baumol, J. Panzar & R. Willig, supra note 173, at 279-303
(existence of economies of scale or "increasing returns" within firms that permit the
survival of only a few large firms in the long run, coupled with barriers to entry that
allow firms to maintain a supracompetitive price without attracting new competition,
explain presence of a monopoly rent). With minor modification, however, the discus-
sion can be adapted to encompass industries in which an expansion of industry output
will yield supracompetitive returns to society but not to the firms in the industries them-
selves: industries in which firms generate positive externalities, e.g., Krugman, Is Free
Trade Passe?, 1 J. Econ. Persp. 131, 137-38 (1987) (positive externalities exist in high-
technology industries where returns to innovation are large and difficult to appropriate),
or in which the costs of production decline with increasing output but firms compete
away the cost savings. See Brander, Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy,
in Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics 23, 32-35 (P. Krugman
ed. 1986). Thus, the analysis extends readily to all of the justifications for strategic trade
policy developed in the economic literature.
183. Of course, this fact would be of little interest if the foreign firms were owned
by domestic stockholders who ultimately captured the monopoly rents as dividends.
184. From the perspective of the foreign producer, a duty is equivalent to a left-
ward shift in the perceived demand curve (and marginal revenue curve) for the pro-
ducer's output. A reduction in price will typically follow.
185. See, e.g., Brander & Spencer, Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition, in
Monopolistic Competition and International Trade 194 (H. Kierzkowski ed. 1984);
Katrak, Multi-National Monopolies and Commercial Policy, 29 Oxford Econ. Papers 283
(1977). Duties on imports purchased from foreign monopolists may also induce domes-
tic entry that ultimately benefits the nation imposing the tariff by reducing monopoly
power in the industry. W. Corden, supra note 67, at 215-19; Brander & Spencer, Tariffs
and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents Under Potential Entry, 14 Can. J. Econ.
371, 378-81 (1981) [hereinafter Brander & Spencer, Extraction of Foreign Rents].
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an upward sloping import supply curve. 186
As with duties to exploit national monopsony power in a competi-
tive market, however, the usefulness of duties for the purpose of rent
extraction has little to do with the existence or nonexistence of subsidi-
zation abroad. Subsidization, if present, is no more than a pretense for
rent-extraction measures that would have much the same appeal in the
absence of subsidization. Among other objections to duties under
these conditions, it may be too optimistic to suppose that foreign gov-
ernments would react passively. They may instead adopt some sort of
retaliatory policy against the exports of the country imposing the duty,
and all nations may suffer in the end. A further objection is that alter-
native government policies, such as price controls, may be potentially
superior to duties for extracting foreign monopoly rents and, unlike
duties, those policies can eliminate distortions attributable to monopo-
listic pricing.' 8 7
Finally, a determination whether a countervailing duty would ex-
tract sufficient rents to offset the decline in the sum of domestic con-
sumer and producer surplus would be extraordinarily difficult. Such a
determination would require consideration of much the same factors
necessary to assess whether a duty would enhance national welfare by
shifting the terms of trade in a competitive market' 88 plus consideration
of factors necessary to predict the consequences of the duty in an im-
perfectly competitive market, including an assessment of the strategic
reaction by foreign producers.' 8 9 That analysis, if it could be under-
taken at all, would be costly and fraught with error. Thus, in the ab-
stract, the use of subsidization as a pretense for the imposition of duties
to extract monopoly rents has no more appeal than the use of subsidi-
zation as a pretense for the imposition of duties to exploit national mo-
nopsony power in a competitive market.
The discussion to this point assumes, however, that all producing
firms are located abroad. The analysis becomes considerably more
complex if some of the producing firms are located at home. To under-
stand these complications, it is essential to understand one possible ex-
186. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
187. See Brander & Spencer, Extraction of Foreign Rents, supra note 185, at
385-86. Tariffs may have appeal as a "second-best" policy for rent extraction, however,
if superior alternatives are for some reason politically infeasible.
188. See supra text following note 93.
189. Brander and Spencer analyze a model with two producing nations and a third
consuming nation. The Cournot-Nash policy equilibrium (Cournot-Nash behavior en-
tails an assumption by each actor that a change in its behavior will not cause other actors
to change their behavior) involves export subsidies by both producing nations and a
"countervailing duty" by the importing nation. Brander & Spencer, Export Subsidies
and International Market Share Rivalry, 18J. Int'l Econ. 83, 83-85 (1985). With simpli-
fying assumptions about demand and cost conditions, the specific (per unit) counter-
vailing duty in Nash equilibrium is equal to the sum of the specific subsidies conferred by
the two subsidizing countries. A small increase in one of the subsidies results in an
increase in the duty equal to one-quarter the increase in the subsidy. Id. at 96-98.
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planation for why foreign subsidies might be introduced in the first
place.
Whenever producers in a worldwide industry earn or could earn
monopoly rents-that is, whenever they sell their output for a price in
excess of its marginal cost or could do so if they could expand to reap
additional economies of scale-the producers in any particular country
might be able to increase their monopoly rents if they could increase
their output. Specifically, under the right cost, demand, and strategic
conditions, an increase in output might result in higher rents if the pro-
ducers who expand their output could then earn comparable rents per
unit on a larger volume of output or larger rents per unit of output. 190
Plainly, if the rents earned by producers in a given country would in-
crease following an expansion of their output, the national economic
welfare of their home country might increase as well, since some of the
increase in rent would come at the expense of foreign rather than do-
mestic consumers. Under these conditions, the country's government
may have an incentive to intervene in the industry to promote an ex-
pansion of domestic production.
One way that a government can promote an expansion of its do-
mestic production is simply to protect its home market from import
competition through tariffs or nontariff barriers.1 91 This policy obvi-
ously has the potential disadvantage of encouraging monopoly pricing
in the protected home market, but may have offsetting advantages due
to the emergence of scale economies and the opportunity to earn
greater rents on exports.1 92 To be sure, these offsetting advantages
may not be enough in the event of foreign retaliation. But putting re-
taliation to one side, the temptation to protect the domestic industry
may be considerable.
Much the same insight might explain why foreign governments ini-
tiate subsidy programs. Subsidies, like tariffs and nontariff-barriers,
can encourage the expansion of home-market producers. In addition,
the expansion of home-market production and the consequent decline
in world prices will often lead to a reduction of output by unsubsidized
producers abroad. As a result, subsidies can shift monopoly rents to
190. Marginal costs might decline due to additional scale economies, or prices
might increase if the output of other producers decreased by an amount greater than the
expansion of output by the producers in question.
191. E.g., Krugman, Import Protection as Export Promotion: International Com-
petition in the Presence of Oligopoly and Economies of Scale, in Monopolisitic Compe-
tition and International Trade, supra note 185, at 180; Venables, Trade and Trade
Policy with Imperfect Competition: The Case of Identical Products and Free Entry, 19J.
Int'l Econ. 1, 12-16 (1985).
192. But see Horstmann & Markusen, Up the Average Cost Curve: Inefficient En-
try and the New Protectionism, 20 J. Int'l Econ. 225, 226 (1986) (protection induces
inefficient entry that offsets, wholly or partially, other benefits of protection); Markusen
& Venables, Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contra-
dictory Results from Competing Assumptions, 24 J. Int'l Econ. 299, 315 (1988) (free
entry reduces gains from activist trade policies).
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the producers receiving the subsidy at the expense of their competi-
tors. 19 3 To be sure, the desirability of such "profit-shifting subsidies"
to the subsidizing country may diminish or vanish altogether if other
producing nations are expected to engage in retaliatory subsidization.
But especially when governments assume that their decisions will not
influence the behavior of other governments, they may find subsidiza-
tion quite tempting.194
Suppose, therefore,, that a worldwide oligopoly is comprised of
both U.S. and foreign producers. A foreign government introduces a
profit-shifting subsidy that leads to an expansion of foreign production,
a contraction of U.S. production, and a shift of monopoly rents to for-
eign producers at the expense of U.S. producers. Assume also that the
U.S. market is an important source of customers for the foreign oligo-
polists. Is a countervailing duty a desirable response to the introduc-
tion of the profit-shifting subsidy?
A duty on U.S. imports certainly will help to counteract the adverse
193. This proposition has been established repeatedly in models that postulate
Cournot behavior by domestic and foreign oligopolists (models in which domestic and
foreign oligopolists are assumed to make output decisions on the assumption that other
oligopolists will not alter their outputs). A subsidy has the effect of lowering costs of
production for the subsidized oligopolists, leading to an expansion of their output. The
unsubsidized foreign oligopolists, taking the new subsidized output levels as unalterable
(the Cournot assumption), respond by reducing their output, and the increase in profit
to the subsidized firm is actually greater than the value of the subsidy. See Brander,
supra note 182, at 29; Brander & Spencer, supra note 189, at 87-94; Brander & Spencer,
International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, 50 Rev. Econ. Stud. 707, 708-11
(1983). A simple, intuitive illustration is developed in Krugman, supra note 182, at
135-37.
The analysis is somewhat more complex when the subsidized good is consumed in
the home market of the subsidizing country and the welfare effect of the subsidy on
domestic consumers must be considered. Nonetheless, a subsidy on all home market
production, or on exports alone, may raise national economic welfare under these con-
ditions. See Brander & Spencer, supra note 189, at 89; Dixit, International Trade Policy
for Oligopolistic Industries, 94 Econ.J. 1, 11-12 (Supp. 1984); Eaton & Grossman, Op-
timal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly, 101 QJ. Econ. 383, 399-402 (1986);
see also Flar & Helpman, Industrial Policy Under Monopolistic Competition, 22 J. Int'l
Econ. 79, 90 (1987) (analyzing the consequences of subsidies in a model of monopolistic
competition). Again, an intuitive illustration is developed by Krugman, supra note 125,
at 97-101.
These results may not survive changes in the assumptions about the nature of the
strategic interaction among oligopolists. One recent paper suggests that if the oligo-
polists operate in a market where they take the prices of other firms as fixed rather than
the outputs of other firms as fixed (a market characterized by Bertrand rather than
Cournot competition), the optimal government policy is a tax rather than a subsidy. See
Eaton & Grossman, supra, at 391-96. Furthermore, if the oligopolists have "consistent
conjectures"-that is, if they accurately anticipate how other oligopolists will respond to
their output decisions-the same paper suggests that nonintervention is the optimal
government policy. Id. at 394-97.
194. See Brander, supra note 182, at 36-43; Brander & Spencer, supra note 189, at
90-94; Eaton & Grossman, supra note 193, at 397-99; Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra
note 11. at 334-36.
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effects of the subsidy on the market share of U.S. producers and shift
some rents back to U.S. producers and to the U.S. government. De-
pending upon cost conditions, demand conditions, the nature of strate-
gic interactions among governments and producers, and so on, the
additional rents to domestic firms and to the government because of
the duty may offset the decline in domestic consumer surplus. Intui-
tively, any net gain to national economic welfare comes from a combi-
nation of two phenomena discussed above-the rent extraction effect
of the duty and an expansion of domestic firms at the expense of for-
eign firms due to the protection of the domestic market.195
Ultimately, however, this scenario does not provide a convincing
basis for the imposition of countervailing duties. Even if foreign gov-
ernments could be expected to react passively, the information neces-
sary to ascertain the welfare consequences of a duty would include
detailed knowledge of worldwide cost and demand conditions and an
understanding of the strategic interaction among domestic and foreign
oligopolists. It seems clear that such information could not be reliably
developed.' 96
In one recent two-country model of countervailing duties under
these conditions, for example, the calculation of the appropriate coun-
tervailing duty required knowledge that the oligopolists played a
Cournot game, 19 7 knowledge of the demand curve in the home market,
and knowledge of the cost functions of the domestic and foreign oligo-
polists.'9 8 Then, on the implicit assumption that retaliation in other
product markets would not occur, an assumption that governments
play a Cournot game with each other in the market under study,' 99 and
with the further simplifying assumptions of constant marginal costs for
all firms and linear demand, it was possible to express the "optimal"
(Cournot equilibrium) countervailing duty as a function of the marginal
costs of domestic and foreign firms and the foreign export subsidy.200
Even then, the optimal duty was not equal to the amount of the subsidy,
but was equal to one-half of the subsidy, plus an adjustment for differ-
ences between domestic and foreign marginal costs. 20 ' The possibility
of cooperative behavior between the two countries to improve upon the
195. Dixit develops a two-country model in which the optimal "countervailing
duty" can be expressed as a function of cost differentials between the two countries and
the export subsidy of the foreign country. Dixit, supra note 193, at 10-12.
196. See Grossman, Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique, in Strategic Trade
Policy and the New International Economics, supra note 182, at 47-68.
197. See supra note 189 (concept of Cournot-Nash behavior).
198. See Dixit, supra note 193, at 10-11.
199. The Cournot assumption about government-to-government interaction is es-
pecially unappealing here: it is unlikely that a subsidizing country will sit idly by and
allow a countervailing duty to capture its export subsidy for a foreign treasury. See
supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
200. See Dixit, supra note 193, at 10-12.
201. Id. at 11.
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Cournot outcome was not addressed, although, plainly, a cooperative
outcome would be superior.
This illustration strongly suggests that the information require-
ments of a countervailing duty policy sensibly designed to counteract
profit-shifting subsidies or other types of strategic trade subsidies are
insurmountable. For all practical purposes, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether a duty will enhance national economic welfare in a given
case. This problem is especially troubling if one supposes that sophisti-
cated foreign subsidy policies of the sort contemplated by the strategic
trade policy literature are rare, so that the number of industries in
which countervailing duties might be appropriate to counteract them is
small. Under these conditions, the case against any type of counter-
vailing duty policy becomes quite powerful: if the optimal counter-
vailing duty is usually zero, and if it is impossible to identify the few
cases in which a nonzero duty is appropriate, then a duty rate of zero in
all cases is probably the best option.
It is even more clear that that the existing countervailing duty laws
bear no relation to a policy sensibly tailored to address the problems
raised in the strategic trade policy literature. The law does not even
take account of the question whether the conditions that might warrant
protection-monopoly rents, significant unrealized scale economies or
positive externalities-exist in the industry under investigation, much
less whether a duty might produce a net gain to the U.S. economy in
cases where these conditions do exist. Consequently, countervailing
duties are commonly imposed under existing law when it seems utterly
implausible that the U.S. economy will reap these types of benefits.
The many steel cases and agricultural cases are once again illustra-
tive.20 2 At a minimum, a policy rationally designed to address strategic
subsidies by foreign governments would limit the application of coun-
tervailing duties to a small subset of the industries to which the law
currently applies. But given the seemingly insurmountable information
requirements of such a policy, perhaps concern about these subsidies is
best left to the realm of theoretical economics and excluded from the
realm of public policy.
VI. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The discussion to this point views the countervailing duty policy of
the United States in isolation, without reference to its possible role in a
broader international regime for the control of subsidies. One possible
202. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. The U.S. steel industry has been
in decline for many years and is hardly a plausible source of supracompetitive returns.
See Hogan, Protectionism in the Steel Industry: A Historical Perspective, in The New
Protectionist Threat to World Welfare, supra note 68, at 352-64. The agricultural sec-
tor is intensely competitive and is also an unlikely source of supracompetitive returns. It
is equally difficult to imagine how steel or agriculture might be a source of unrealized
scale economies or significant positive externalities.
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justification for the U.S. countervailing duty laws, however, views those
laws not simply in terms of their market-by-market effects in individual
cases, but as part of a larger multilateral system to discourage trade-
distorting subsidies, or facilitate trade concessions. The existing U.S.
countervailing duty laws, however, cannot be understood as part of a
system to enforce multilateral restraints on trade-distorting subsidies,
because such restraints in large part do not exist, and because unilat-
eral countervailing duties are, in any event, unlikely to serve as an effec-
tive enforcement mechanism. Neither can existing U.S. law be justified
as a method for facilitating trade concessions.
A. Deterrence of Inefficient Subsidization
Subsidies may enhance or distort resource allocation in the subsi-
dizing country, just as they may enhance or distort resource allocation
in the world as a whole. A subsidy can enhance resource allocation in
the subsidizing country if it corrects some preexisting market failure
(externality) in that country. The inability of private firms to appropri-
ate gains from innovation, for example, may lead to inefficiently little
investment in research and development in some industries and pro-
vide ajustification for R&D subsidies. Subsidies to correct such market
failures also tend to improve resource allocation in the world as a whole
by moving resources to their most valuable uses and increasing the ag-
gregate value of world output. These subsidies seem desirable, there-
fore, and aside perhaps from short-run adjustment costs that they may
impose upon other countries, 20 3 the nations of the world have no mu-
tual interest in deterring them or counteracting them.
Other types of subsidies are more troublesome for the world econ-
omy. As the prior discussion of strategic trade policy suggests, 20 4 some
subsidies may enhance the economic welfare of the subsidizing country
while imposing costs on other countries that exceed the benefits to the
subsidizing country. Subsidies to enable domestic producers in imper-
fectly competitive industries to capture a greater share of monopoly
rents in world markets, for example, may have this characteristic.
20 5
Still other types of subsidies reduce not only worldwide economic wel-
fare, but seemingly reduce the economic welfare of the subsidizing
203. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
205. A subsidy to a domestic oligopolist, designed to facilitate its expansion at the
expense of foreign oligopolists, can have two offsetting consequences. First, it tends to
induce a net expansion of output by the oligopolistic industry. Other things being
equal, such an expansion typically increases worldwide welfare by reducing prices and
thereby reducing the distortion attributable to supracompetitive pricing in the oligo-
polistic industry. But the subsidy also induces a shift of production to the subsidized
producers. If those producers are less efficient than their competitors, output is pro-
duced at higher cost. This tends to reduce worldwide welfare. Where both effects are
present, the net effect is ambiguous.
19891 257
HeinOnline  -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  257 1989
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
country itself.20 6 Many agricultural subsidies seem to have this
characteristic. 20 7
The adverse effect of subsidies upon worldwide economic welfare
can be compounded if political forces compel governments to engage
in "competitive subsidization" by matching the subsidies that are
granted by the governments of other trading nations. Recently, for ex-
ample, when the European Community initiated a subsidy program to
encourage wheat exports, farm interests in the United States persuaded
the U.S. government to initiate a wheat export subsidy program of its
own. 20 8 In general, the strategic environment facing governments that
must choose whether to initiate subsidy programs may resemble a pris-
oner's dilemma game. If governments behave noncooperatively, each
may find that subsidization is the dominant strategy, with the result that
each nation is worse off because all nations grant subsidies.20 9
To escape pressures to grant subsidies that reduce domestic eco-
nomic welfare, and to escape pressures for competitive subsidization,
trading nations may wish to establish international constraints upon
subsidy practices. If such constraints eliminate subsidies that reduce
worldwide economic welfare, nations on average will benefit. Thus, an
effective system of international constraints on welfare-reducing subsi-
206. To illustrate, consider a widget subsidy that allows widgets to be produced
and sold in a competitive market at a price below the social marginal cost of the inputs
needed to produce it. Such a subsidy distorts resource allocation in the subsidizing
country (putting aside second-best issues) because, in the absence of the subsidy, some
of the inputs used to produce widgets would be shifted to the production of alternative
products with a value at least equal to the cost of the inputs. That is, in the absence of
the subsidy, resources would be reallocated so that the same quantity of inputs was used
to produce an output of greater value. The subsidizing country as a whole would realize
a greater return from its productive activities, and thus its economic welfare would in-
crease.
Such a subsidy also distorts worldwide resource allocation: even though other
countries may benefit from the opportunity to buy subsidized widgets, the benefits to
these countries are less than the costs to the subsidizing country. This conclusion again
follows from the fact that the price of the subsidized widgets is less than the social mar-
ginal cost of the inputs used to produce them. The value of worldwide output, along
with worldwide economic welfare, would increase if the inputs used to produce marginal
widgets were shifted to a higher-valued use.
207. For example, agricultural subsidies often take the form of price supports. A
price support program that leads to prices above the competitive level will create ineffi-
ciency by encouraging production to a point where the marginal costs of production
exceed the willingness-to-pay of marginal consumers.
208. See EG Wages Counterattack in Markets Threatened by U.S. Export Enhance-
ment, Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 4, 1985, at 1, 11.
It is reported that farm subsidies in the industrialized countries total $200 billion
per year. Proposals by the United States government for a multilateral agreement to
eliminate farm subsidies over a 10 year period have met with little enthusiasm abroad.
See Farnsworth, The Industrialized World Shows Its Love for the Farm, N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1988, at E2, col. 1.
209. See Brander, supra note 182, at 36-38; Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note
11, at 334-36.
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dies may be understood as a way out of the prisoner's dilemma-a way
to achieve the cooperative'solution. A system of constraints upon sub-
sidies may accomplish little, however, without an enforcement mecha-
nism. If compliance is "voluntary," governments may lack the ability to
resist domestic political pressures for new subsidies. Countervailing
duties are one possible enforcement device. 210
For the reasons developed earlier, however, many foreign subsi-
dies enhance the economic welfare of importing nations.211 Thus, to
the extent that an international agreement restricting subsidy practices
is not limited to classes of subsidies that are injurious to the importing
nation, such as foreign government-financed predation and certain sub-
sidies introduced for purposes of strategic trade policy, a country that
uses countervailing duties does not directly benefit in many cases from
the protection that the duties afford to the home market. Viewed myo-
pically, such protection will often be detrimental to national economic
welfare. The benefits of the international agreement to each country
arise because of the broader system of constraints that the agreement
places upon the ability of all participating governments to engage in
welfare-reducing subsidization. In particular, the systematic gains to
participating nations emerge because the threat of countervailing du-
ties abroad enables each nation to resist political pressures at home for
wasteful subsidization, and the use of countervailing duties by all coun-
tries deters subsidies that would otherwise injure each nation's export-
ers in their overseas markets. Occasional protection of the home
market through the use of a countervailing duty, though costly in many
cases to the nation that imposes the duty, is the quid pro quo for these
benefits.
This observation immediately suggests several reasons why the ex-
isting U.S. countervailing duty laws cannot be understood as part of
such a system. First, multilateral restrictions on most of the subsidy
practices that are countervailable under U.S. law simply do not exist.
The only important international restrictions are those of the GATT
system. Yet GATT signatories and signatories to the GATT Subsidies
Code are subject to significant restrictions only with respect to their use
of export subsidies on nonprimary products. 21 2 Export subsidies on pri-
210. See G. Hufbauer & J. Erb, supra note 26, at 5-9 (arguing for discipline of
subsidies so that "unbridled and competing national subsidies" do not undermine world
prosperity); Barcelo, supra note 12, at 798-800 (recommending international ban on
most export subsidies and permissive standard for the imposition of countervailing du-
ties in response to injurious, trade-distorting domestic subsidies); Ordover, Sykes &
Willig, supra note 11, at 336 (discussing use of countervailing duties to discourage sub-
sidies that reduce worldwide welfare).
211. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
212. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI(4); Subsidies Code, supra note 14, art. 9.
Under the GAIT, "primary products" are defined as products of farm, forest or fishery,
or minerals, at the earliest stage of processing suitable for international trade in substan-
tial quantities. GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI(B)(2). The Subsidies Code modifies this
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mary products are subject only to vague constraints that have little bite
in practice.21 3 Domestic subsidies are subject to no significant con-
straints whatsoever. 21 4 Hence, except with respect to a subset of ex-
port subsidies, no system of international constraints exists that might
require an enforcement mechanism. U.S. law can hardly be understood
as a means to help enforce international rules of the game if those rules
have yet to be created. 215
Second, countervailing duties are unlikely to be very useful as a
means to enforce international constraints on subsidies unless the du-
ties are imposed multilaterally. The unilateral imposition of counter-
vailing duties by a single country will deter subsidization by other
governments only haphazardly, and then only when such deterrence is
perhaps least likely to enhance, or most likely to reduce, the economic
welfare of the country that imposes the duty.21 6 In addition, the unilat-
eral imposition of countervailing duties will do little to deter wasteful
expenditures on subsidies by the government that imposes the duties,
although it may sometimes serve as an alternative to competitive subsi-
dization. As suggested above, therefore, the two systematic benefits to
countries that participate in an international agreement to restrict sub-
sidy practices-the constraints on the ability of each government to en-
gage in wasteful subsidization expenditures itself and the elimination of
subsidized competition in each country's export markets-arise only if
other countries are willing to use countervailing duties systematically
against prohibited subsidy practices. The United States is presently the
only major trading nation to use countervailing duties with any regular-
ity, however, and the other countries that do use countervailing duties
on occasion do not do so in coordination in the United States. 217
In short, it is impossible to understand or justify the existing U.S.
countervailing duty laws as a component of a larger international
scheme to enforce multilateral constraints on welfare-reducing subsi-
definition to exclude mineral products. Subsidies Code, supra note 14, art. 9 n.29. All
other products are "non-primary" products in the terminology of the text.
213. The principal constraint is that export subsidies on primary products shall not
enable the subsidizing country to obtain "more than an equitable share of world export
trade" of the subsidized product. GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI(3); Subsidies Code,
supra note 14, art. 10. This concept is so vague as to be largely unenforceable.
214. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XVI(1); Subsidies Code, supra note 14, arts. 8,
11.
215. In addition, GATT restrictions on export subsidies have an enforcement
mechanism within the GAT that does not rely upon the willingness of signatories to
impose countervailing duties. If a signatory grants an impermissible export subsidy, an
aggrieved party can file a GATT complaint, invoking an elaborate dispute resolution
procedure, See GAT, supra note 13, art. XXIII; Subsidies Code, supra note 14, arts.
12, 13. For reasons discussed in the text, this may well provide a more effective remedy
to an aggrieved country than the unilateral imposition of countervailing duties by that
country.
216. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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dies. Even if countervailing duties might in the abstract have a role to
play in such a scheme, the international consensus and coordination
necessary to make countervailing duties a useful tool of enforcement
simply do not exist at present.
B. Facilitation of Trade Concessions
A recent international economics textbook advances an interesting
hypothesis about the rationale for restrictions on export subsidies
under the GATT:
A prohibition against export subsidies was written into
the original GATT .... When governments undertake to cut
their tariffs or promise not to raise them, they are entitled to
expect that other governments will not nullify the effects of
the tariffs that remain, which is what export subsidies can do.
If the United States has a 10 percent tariff on imported steel,
but Brazil grants a 10 percent export subsidy to its steel indus-
try, Brazilian steel will enter the United States at its free-trade
price, and the American steel industry will not be protected.
Widespread use of export subsidies could undermine the
framework for trade liberalization established by the GATT
and lead to tariff warfare.218
Thus, the author suggests that a prohibition upon export subsidies is
important to facilitate tariff concessions. In the absence of the prohibi-
tion, countries would fear the use of export subsidies to circumvent
new, lower tariff rates and might be unwilling to make tariff concessions
in the first place.
In principle, countervailing duty laws might serve a similar pur-
pose. Absent a GATT restriction or some other mechanism to prevent
the beneficiaries of tariff concessions from using subsidies to circum-
vent new tariff rates, a country making a tariff concession can protect
itself with a countervailing duty law that allows it to impose duties to
offset any new subsidies.21 9 Conceivably, the existence of this protec-
tion might facilitate tariff concessions that would not otherwise be
made. This justification for countervailing duty laws is a variant of a
more general and increasingly familiar argument for limited protec-
tionist measures. These "pragmatic free trade" 220 justifications for
protection rely upon a simple premise: a little protection is better than
a lot.2 2 '
218. P. Kenen, supra note 76, at 250.
219. The countervailing duty laws were indeed enacted in part out of a desire to
maintain the existing level of protection against erosion by foreign subsidies. See supra
note 1. The excerpt from Kenen's textbook suggests a slightly different proposition:
the net amount of protection might be lower with countervailing duty laws in place be-
cause their existence makes the United States willing to accept more than offsetting tariff
reductions.
220. See R. Lawrence & R. Litan, supra note 63, at 13.
221. A possible variation on this type of argument for countervailing duties is the
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Such claims are always difficult to evaluate since their truth or fal-
sity depends upon an unverifiable counterfactual hypothesis about the
level of protection that would arise in the absence of some existing pro-
tectionist policy. Consequently, "pragmatic free trade" arguments can
be-and are-invoked in support of all manner of protectionist meas-
ures. A simple response to these arguments is to concede that a little
protection is better than a lot, but to suggest further that no protection
is better than a little. One can argue, therefore, that if the counter-
vailing duty laws reduce national economic welfare, then the nation
would be better off by abolishing them, other things being equal. The
assertion that other things cannot be equal for political reasons may or
may not be correct, but does not alter any conclusions about the ideal
course of public policy.
If this response seems unsatisfactory, there are several more spe-
cific responses to the particular claim that countervailing duty laws may
be necessary to facilitate tariff concessions. First, the assertion that na-
tions will be tempted to circumvent lower tariff rates through the use of
subsidies seems greatly exaggerated. In the example quoted above, if
Brazil confers a ten percent export subsidy to overcome a ten percent
U.S. tariff and thereby enables Brazilian steelmakers to increase their
U.S. sales, the subsidy on the increment in sales is a direct transfer from
the Brazilian Treasury to the U.S. Treasury. It is not at all clear why
Brazil would wish to bestow such a benefit upon the U.S. government,
or why any propensity to do so increases as tariff rates decline. To the
contrary, as tariff rates fall, it seems equally possible that foreign gov-
ernments may reduce their subsidies because the subsidies are no
longer as important to the ability of their exporters to sell abroad.222
Second, nothing in the history of the U.S. countervailing duty laws
suggests that they were enacted because of a concern that subsidies
would be used to circumvent the lower tariffs that would prevail after a
round of tariff concessions. To the contrary, the countervailing duty
laws have existed since 1897,223 long before the formation of the
suggestion that countervailing duty laws reduce the political pressure for competitive
subsidization. If domestic producers could not secure protection from subsidized for-
eign competition, they might instead obtain subsidies that would impose an even greater
cost on the national economy.
222. For example, suppose that Brazilian manufacturers of widgets can produce
and sell them to the United States at a delivered price of one dollar per widget below the
price charged by U.S. widget makers. But the United States initially imposes a tariff of
two dollars per widget, so that Brazil is unable to compete. If export sales to the United
States are for some reason vital to Brazil (a dubious assumption), Brazil might then be
tempted to grant an export subsidy of one dollar per widget to make its widgets compet-
itive. But if the United States reduces its tariff to one dollar per widget, the export
subsidy is no longer necessary to the competitiveness of Brazilian exports, and the pos-
siblity arises that the subsidy will be discontinued.
223. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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GATT or the advent of major international tariff negotiations. 224
Finally, nothing prevents U.S. tariff negotiators from striking prod-
uct-by-product bargains with the countries that benefit from U.S. tariff
concessions to restrict their future subsidy practices or to preserve the
right to use countervailing duties. It seems unlikely that a wide-ranging
countervailing duty law, applicable to all manner of subsidies on every
imported product, is really necessary for tariff negotiations to go
forward.
In short, the "pragmatic free trade" justification for countervailing
duties also seems to fail as an explanation for the structure and scope of
the U.S. countervailing duty laws. There is little evidence that existing
law is or was essential to facilitate politically sensitive tariff concessions,
or that the overall level of protection in the United States would be
greater in the absence of a countervailing duty policy.
CONCLUSION
None of the plausible efficiency justifications for countervailing du-
ties can persuasively explain or justify the existing countervailing duty
laws of the United States. A corollary of this proposition is that central
features of existing law, such as the distinction between export subsi-
dies and domestic subsidies, the specificity test, and the injury test,
have no convincing efficiency rationale.
Given the present lack of international coordination for the disci-
pline of welfare-reducing subsidy practices, and the resulting unilateral
nature of U.S. policy, abolition of the countervailing duty laws might
best serve the national economic interest. Alternatively, if abolition of
the countervailing duty laws is unlikely in the existing political climate,
then reform of the law is in order. But the proper directions for reform
remain unclear since it is unclear which of the various policy objectives
considered above are worth pursuing through a countervailing duty
policy. There are reasons to be skeptical about all of them.
224. See supra notes 1 & 13-14 and accompanying text.
Indeed, Kenen's assertion that restrictions on export subsidies in the GATT were
devisei to facilitate tariff concessions is suspect. The history of GATT suggests that the
export subsidy provisions were developed because of a broader desire on the part of the
contracting parties to constrain government distortions of trade. See, e.g., K. Dam, The
GATT 132-35 (1970); J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 365-71 (1969).
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